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The truth is, that the great principles of the 
Constitution proposed by the convention may be consid-
ered less as absolutely new, than as the expansion of 
principles which are found in the articles of Confedera-
tion. The misfortune under the latter system has been, 
that these principles are so feeble and confined as to 
justify all the charges of inefficiency which have been 
urged against it, and to require a degree of enlargement 
which gives to the new system the aspect of an entire 
transformation of the old. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, issues concerning the federal structure of the United States 
under the Constitution, and the role of the states as entities in this 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 255 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). See also GORDON s. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-
1787, at 359 (1969) ("What is truly remarkable about the Confederation is the degree 
of union that was achieved."). 
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structure, have come to the forefront of legal scholarship.' For 
example, a number of questions have been raised concerning the powers 
allocated between the federal government and the several states. 
Questions such as the proper scope of the federal commerce power,3 
2. As one commentator has noted, historically there has been great debate over 
the precise meaning of the tenn "federalism": 
[a]lthough virtually no one contests the significance of federalism's influence 
on the organization and operation of American government and poJitics, what 
is contested endlessly is the precise meaning of federalism. Remarkably, the 
specific form and intentions of the Constitution of 1787 have not been able to 
create a settled, broadly shared meaning of the tenn. 
ROBERT W. HOFFERT, A POLmCS OF TENSIONS: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
AND AMERICAN PoLmCAL IDEAS xi (1992). Despite disagreement over what exactly 
"federalism" is, federalism concerns have been discussed by legal commentators in a 
variety of areas. See, e.g., SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY 
OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1993); RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' 
DESIGN (1987); VINCENT OSTROM, THE POLIDCAL THEORY OF A COMPOUND REPUBLIC 
(2d ed. 1987); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 
(1987); Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design-A Response to Michael 
McConnell, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 51 (1988); Murray Dry, Federalism and the 
Constitution: The Founders' Design and Contemporary Constitutional Law, 4 CONST. 
COMMENTARY 233 (1987); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: 
An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
615 (1995); Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEx. L. REV. 
795 (1996); Jacques LeBoeuf, The Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of 
the Federal Commerce Power, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 555 (1994); Calvin R. Massey, 
Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 305 
(1987); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' 
DESIGN (1987)); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and 
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLOM. L. REV. 121, 124 (1996) (noting that there have 
recently been fifteen state resolutions reaffirming the Tenth Amendment); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The Modem Misunderstanding of Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1513 
(1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)); 
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Donnant Commerce Clause and the 
Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569; Carol M. Rose, The Ancient 
Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism from the Attack on "Monar-
chism" to Modem Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74 (1989); Edward L. Rubin & 
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
903 (1994); Symposium, Federalism: Allocating Responsibility Between the Federal and 
State Courts, 19 GA. L. REV. 789 (1985); Symposium, Federalism's Future, 47 V AND. 
L. REV. 1205 (1994); Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 533 (1995); William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth 
Amendment: Adrift in the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769 (1987); A Symposium on 
Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y I (1982). 
3. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that a statute 
reguJating the possession of guns within a certain distance of a school exceeded "the 
authority ofCongress·•[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States"') (citation 
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whether the states can impose term limits on members of Congress,4 the 
ability of the federal government to provide for suits against the states,5 
and the extent to which the federal government can define new crimes,6 
have recently been addressed in Supreme Court decisions acknowledging 
the importance of federalism in our constitutional structure. The 
resolution of such questions is a particularly intractable problem in our 
federal system within which the national government is granted only 
certain limited and enumerated powers. As Justice Marshall noted in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, "the question respecting the extent of the 
powers actually granted [to the federal government], is perpetually 
arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall 
exist."7 However, such questions touch only the tip of the iceberg when 
it comes to examining the nuances of the federal structure established 
under the Constitution. Many other questions such as the role of the 
states in the federal system, the "legality'' of amendment to the 
Constitution outside Article V, and the constitutionality of seccession all 
omitted); id. at 570 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The Founding Fathers confinned that 
most areas of life ( even many matters that would have substantial effects on commerce) 
would remain outside the reach of the Federal Government. Such affairs would continue 
to be under the exclusive control of the States."). See also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. 
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 583 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Framers believed that the commerce power was "important but limited, and expected that 
it would be used primarily if not exclusively to remove interstate tariffs and to regulate 
maritime affairs and large.scale mercantile enterprise."); BERGER, FEDERALISM: nm 
FOUNDERS' DESIGN, supra note 2, at 125 (arguing that the Commerce Clause empowers 
Congress only to regulate trade across state lines); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope 
of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1442 (1987) (arguing for a narrow 
interpretation of the federal commerce power). 
4. See U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (holding that the 
states could not add qualifications for membership in the Senate or House of Representa• 
tives to those already enumerated in Article I}. 
5. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, I 16 S. Ct. II 14 (1996) (holding that 
Congress Jacked authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the states' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity). 
6. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549; see also Steven G. Calabresi, ''.A Government of 
Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. 
REV. 752 (1995). Professor Calabresi bas noted the great danger and potential abuse that 
may be occasioned by reading the constraints of federalism out of the Constitution: 
[T]he commerce power is being used to nationalize state criminal law, a 
decision that is fraught with danger and controversy. This process of 
nationalization, which is rapidly gathering steam, threatens to have severe 
adverse consequences for liberty and for the crowded dockets of the federal 
courts, a matter on which the Supreme Court has special claims to institutional 
competence. 
Id. at 805. 
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,405 (1819). See also New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 147 (1992) (stating that the question of "discerning the proper division of 
authority between the Federal Government and the States" is "as old as the Constitution" 
itselt). 
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invoke the central principles of the federal structure established under the 
Constitution. 8 
To examine the nature of the .federal system established under the 
Constitution, it is useful to examine the preceding federal system 
established under the Articles of Confederation. The Articles of 
Confederation were often criticized by Federalists,9 and even 
Antifederalists,'0 as creating a relatively weak general government that 
8. See infra Part V (applying the theories developed in this Article to these 
questions). 
9. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 87 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1961) ("[O]pponents as well as •.. friends of the new Constitution ... in general 
appear to harmonize in this sentiment, at least, that there are material imperfections in 
our national system, and that something is necessary to be done to rescue us from 
impending anarchy."); id. No. 40, at 255 (James Madison) (noting the "charges of 
inefficiency" levelled at the general government under the Articles). For example, one 
commentator noted the importance of changing the current system: 
The importance of preserving an union, and of establishing a government equal 
to the purpose of maintaining that union, is a sentiment deeply impressed on 
the mind of every citizen of America. It is now no longer doubted, that the 
confederation, in its present form, is inadequate to that end: Some reform in 
our government must take place: In this, all parties agree .... 
A Plebian [Melancthon Smith], An Address to the People of the State of New York: 
Shewing the Necessity of Making Amendments to the Constitution. Proposed far the 
United States, Previous to its Adoption II (1788), reprinted in P AMP!Il.ETS ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE 
PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 99 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1971) (1888). See also Letter from 
James Madison to Professor Davis (1832), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787, at 520 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) [hereinafter RECORDS OFTIIE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION] ("In expounding the Constitution and deducing the intention of its framers, 
it should never be forgotten, that the great object of the Convention was to provide, by 
a new Constitution, a remedy for the defects of the existing one."). 
I 0. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 87 (Herbert J. Storing ed., I 981) 
(statement of Edmund Randolph) (noting that "the confederation was destitute of every 
energy, which a constitution of the United States ougbt to possess"); id. at 156, 161 
(remarks of Centinel) (observing that "[e]xperience [has] sh[o]wn great defects in the 
present confederation" and "[t]hat the present confederation is inadequate to the objects 
of the union seems to be universally allowed"); id. at 363-64 (statement of Brutus) 
(noting that "[w]e have felt the feebleness of the ties by which these United States are 
held together, and the want of sufficient energy in our present confederation, to manage, 
in some instances, our general concerns"); 3 id. at 15 (Minority of the Pennsylvania 
House of Representatives) (stating that "[t]he confederation no doubt is defective and 
requires amendment and revision"); id. at 23 (An Old Whig) (noting that "[i]t was the 
misfortune of these articles of confederation that they did not by express words give to 
Congress power sufficient for the pu,poses of the union"); id. at 67 (A Federal Republi-
can) (observing that "[w]e were taught by sad experience, the defect of the present 
articles of confederation, and wisely determined to alter and amend them"); id. at 123 
(Philadelphiensis) (concluding that "the powers of congress were certainly too limitted 
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was unable to exert its supremacy over the state governments. This is 
the standard view of the general government under the Articles held by 
modem commentators as well." However, as the above passage from 
The Federalist No. 40 illustrates, there were profound similarities 
[sic] to promote the general good of the nnion''); S id. at 257 {George Mason) {"I 
candidly acknowledge the inefficacy of the confederation"); 6 id. at ISO {Melancthon 
Smith) (stating that "[t]he defects of the Old Confederation needed as little proof as the 
necessity of an Union"); S id. at 199 (fbe Impartial Examiner) ("It seems to be agreed 
on all sides that in the present system of nnion the Congress are not invested with 
sufficient powers for regulating commerce, and procuring the requisite contn"butions for 
all expences, that may be incUITed for the common defense or general welfare."), 
I I. The standard view held by commentators is that the Confederation era was a 
period in which the general government suffered from a lack of necessary power, See 
HERBERT APTHEKER, EARLY YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC 37 (1976) (noting that "clear 
evidences of inadequacies were present and were recognized by all elements of the 
revolutionary coalition"); MAx FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 47 (1913) {noting that the weaknesses of the general government "were 
self-evident and there seems to have been a general unanimity of sentiment in favor of 
the reforms proposed"); JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 
1783-1789, at I 71 (1888) ("[I]he different states, with their different tariff and tonnage 
acts, began to make commercial war upon one another."); NOEL B. GERSON, FREE AND 
INDEPENDENT: THE CONFEDERATION OF TilE UNITED STATES, 1781-1789, at 146-47 
(1970); MAJOR PROBLEMS IN TIIE ERA OF TIIE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1760-1791, at 
389 (Richard D. Brown ed., 1992) [hereinafter MAJOR PROBLEMS] {"The history of this 
Confederation era, once called the critical period, has been dominated by the Federalist 
belief that the Articles of Confederation were a failure and that the Constitution of 1787 
rescued the nation."). As Professor Amar bas noted, 
The unicameral assembly created by the Articles lacked power to regulate 
commerce; to levy duties; to legislate directly upon, and directly tax, 
individuals; to nullify unjust internal state laws; to enact laws incidental to, or 
implied by, express enumerations; to nationalize state militias; to directly raise 
an army and navy; to appoint all military officers; to suppress internal 
insurrections, coups, and anti-republican governments; to directly execute its 
own enactments; to set up a general system of national courts; and to insist on 
observance of the Articles and its own enactments thereunder as supreme law 
overriding even state constitutions. 
Amar, supra note 2, at 1442. See also Van Alstyne, supra note 2, at 773 ("From 1781 
to 1787, the Articles of Confederation had set the sole terms of national government, in 
its lesser specifications of weakly enumerated national powers. The felt deficiencies in 
those enumerations led to the Annapolis and Philadelphia conventions."); Gordon S. 
Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution, in BEYOND 
CoNFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF TIIE CoNSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
69, 72 (Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987) (stating that "[b]y 1787 almost every political 
leader in the country, including most of the later Antifederalists, wanted something done 
to strengthen the Articles of Confederation"). Even the Supreme Court noted the relative 
impotence of the federal government 
[O]wing to the imbecility of congress, the powers of the states being reserved 
for legislative and judicial purposes, and the utter want of power in the United 
States to act directly on the people of the states, on the rights of the states 
( except those in controversy between them) or the subject matters, on which 
they had delegated but mere shadowy jurisdiction, a radical change of 
government became necessary. 
Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet) 657, 729 (1838). 
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between the Articles and the Constitution.12 Both the Articles and the 
Constitution established "federal" systems of multiple sovereigns whose 
continued existence was constitutionally guaranteed.13 As James 
Madison noted, the Constitution merely elaborated upon the principles 
that informed the Articles.14 Thus, examination of the Articles may 
yield valuable insights into the structure of the federal system established 
under the Constitution. 
Despite the fact that both the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution established federal systems, there were certain fundamental 
differences between the two systems. The most fundamental difference 
was the structure of political authority. As James Madison noted in The 
Federalist No. 37, the Constitution represented a fundamental change in 
the "superstructure" upon which the union rested.15 The federal 
government under the Articles of Confederation was dependent upon the 
states. The states as entities were the sole source of the political 
authority of the federal government under the Articles, whereas under 
the Constitution, the federal government derived its authority directly 
from the states as well as the people----the whole people of the nation, 
not merely the various peoples of each state considered as entities.16 
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 240 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976) (asking "is it not manifest that most of the capital objections urged against the 
new system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation?"); HOFFERT, 
supra note 2, at 29 ("Both the Constitution of 1787 and the Articles of Confederation 
are dominated by discussions of two broad categories--govemmental structures and 
governmental powers."). 
13. See HOFFERT, supra note 2, at 30 ("The Articles set up a federal system or 
confederacy described as a league of friendship among sovereign states forming a 
'perpetual union. 111). 
14. See supra note I and accompanying text 
15. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 226 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). 
16. See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text for a discussion of this 
difference between the Articles and the Constitution. See also Hawke v. Smith, 253 
U.S. 221, 226 (1920) ("The Constitution of the United States was ordained by the 
people, and, when duly ratified, it became the Constitution of the people of the United 
States.") (citation omitted); Ex parte Yarbrough, I IO U.S. 651, 666 (1884) (noting that 
"[i]n a republican government, like ours, .•. political power is reposed in representatives 
of the entire body of the people"); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 
404-05 (1819) (Marshall, J.) ("The government of the union, then, ..• is, emphatically, 
and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from them. 
Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their 
benefit."); Amar, supra note 2, at 1463 n.l 63. But see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 812 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate source of 
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The Articles of Confederation represented a compact among the states 
as entities alone, whereas the Constitution was a compact among both 
the states as entities and the people directly.17 
An implication of this break from the structure of the Articles was that 
for the first time there was a recognition that the whole people could act 
to define the scope of the powers exercised by the states individually. 
This power no longer rested solely with the states themselves. Thus, 
there was the possibility of a complete consolidation of the states into 
a unitary national government under the Constitution, which had not 
existed under the Articles. This was the great danger with which the 
Antifederalists opposing the new Constitution were concemed.'8 Once 
this power of the people was recognized, conceivably the people could 
amend the Constitution in the future in such a way that the powers of 
the states would gradually be eroded.19 
In order to gain new insights into the fundamental changes in the 
federal system made under the Constitution and the current debate over 
federalism, this Article compares the federal structures established under 
the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation. Part II discusses 
certain early models of political union that may have influenced the 
thought of the Framers of both the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution. Many of the concepts underlying the federal structures of 
the Articles and the Constitution were already found in the works of 
various political writers with whom the Framers were familiar. In 
particular, the concept of a division of sovereignty between a general 
government and subordinate governments was not novel, but was 
the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the 
consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole."), 
17. As Justice MarshaJI noted in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
To the formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the State 
sovereignties were certainly competent But when, "in order to form a more 
perfect union," it was deemed necessary to change this alliance into an 
effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and acting 
directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of 
deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by aJI. 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 404. 
18. See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text For example, Professor Amar 
has noted that "'We the People of the United States' may choose to destroy states by 
constitutional amendment" Amar, supra note 2, at 1465 n.167. Unfortunately he 
concludes, however, that such amendment may occur ouu.ide the constraints of Article 
V through a bare majority of the national populace. See id. at 1465 ("Relocating 
sovereignty in the People of the United States in the late 1780's did not obliterate all 
state lines; it only established that any power exercised by state Peoples and slate 
governments was ultimately subject to the absolute control of the American People."); 
see also infra notes 266-78 and accompanying text, discussing Professor Amar's theory 
of amendment outside Article V. 
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expressed in the writings of various political philosophers well before 
ratification of the Articles of Confederation. Part ill examines the text 
of the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation, focusing on the 
structural similarities and differences between these two documents that 
are relevant in establishing their respective federal systems. Many of the 
provisions establishing the federal structure under the Constitution had 
analogues in the Articles of Confederation, indicating their importance 
in delineating the federal structures under both constitutional regimes. 
In fact, the Federalists, and Madison in particular, contended repeatedly 
that the new Constitution was strikingly similar to the Articles of 
Confederation. Part IV applies social compact theories that were 
prevalent in the late eighteenth century in an attempt to gain greater 
understanding of the nature of the federal systems established under the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. 1bis analysis indicates 
that the fundamental difference between the Articles and the Constitution 
is that the latter represented a compact among both the people and the 
states, whereas the former represented a compact among the states alone. 
In other words, the Constitution represented merely a partial consolida-
tion20 of the states----the Constitution was not purely a compact among 
the people as a nation21 or the states as entities22 as some commenta-
tors have contended. Part V applies the theory presented in this Article 
to several current debates engaging legal academics, including whether 
the Constitution is amendable outside the procedures listed in Article V, 
the constitutionality of secession, and the proper interpretation of the 
20. See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text The Supreme Court has 
recently noted the importance of this feature of the Constitution. As Justice Stevens 
noted in U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), 
(T]he Constitutional Convention did not contemplate "[a]n entire consolidation 
of the States into one complete national sovereignty," but only a partial 
consolidation in which "the State governments would clearly retain all the 
rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were no~ by that ac~ 
exclusively delegated to the United States." 
Id. at 791 (quoting DIE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
21. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 2 (arguing that the Constitution was an expression 
of national popular sovereignty). 
22. See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 812 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The ultimate source of the Constitution's authority is the 
consent of the people of each individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated 
people of the Nation as a whole."); id. at 814 ("The Constitution simply does not 
recognize any mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of the Nation."); 
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN, supra note 2 (focusing on the states 
as entities). 
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enumerated powers of the general government. Finally, Part VI offers 
a brief conclusion. 
In particular, the constitutionality of amendment proceedings outside 
Article V has been heatedly contested among legal academics. Professors 
Bruce Ackerman23 and Akhil Amar24 have recently argued that the 
people retain the power to amend the Constitution in a manner that does 
not conform with the procedures established under Article V. Although 
other commentators have presented counterarguments based on the 
constitutional text and the ratification debates,25 they have not focused 
on the political theories underlying the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution. The fact that the Constitution was thought to represent a 
compact among both the people and the states dictated that a majority 
of the people as well as the states would be necessary for amendment. 
Article V's three-fourths requirement closely tracks this theory. 
II. EARLY MODELS OF POLITICAL UNION 
Neither the Framers of the Articles of Confederation nor the Framers 
of the Constitution were working from a completely blank slate when 
constructing the federal systems established under these two documents. 
There were various examples throughout history of political unions of 
varying degrees among states that might serve as blueprints from which 
to construct a union among the several states of North America.26 For 
example, The Federalist Papers often referred to a variety of confedera-
tions that had existed historically27 or that existed contemporaneous-
23. See Bruce Ackennan & Neal Katya!, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 475 (1995). 
24. See Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution 
Outside Article V, 55 u. cm. L. REV. 1043 (1988). 
25. See, e.g., David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The 
Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L REv. 1 (1990); Monaghan, supra note 2. 
26. It is interesting to note that today architects of new federal systems often look 
to the United States as a source of comparisons. See, e.g., George A. Bennann, Taking 
Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994); Thomas C. Fischer, "Federalism" in the European 
Community and the United States: A Rose by any Other Name, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 
389 (1994). 
27. See THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 52-53 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead 
Earle ed., 1976) (noting Montesquieu's discussion of the Lycian confederacy); id. No. 
16, at 95-101 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the Lycian and Achaean leagues); id. 
No. 17, at I 04 (Alexander Hamilton) ("Though the ancient feudal systems were not, 
strictly speaking, confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of associa-
tion."); id. at 105 ("The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared 
with the feudal baronies"); id. No. 18, at 106 (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison) 
("Among the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was that of the Grecian 
republics, associated under the Amphictyonic council. From the best accounts 
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ly.28 Furthermore, various limited plans of union among the states had 
been devised prior to ratification of the Articles of Confederation, such 
as the New England Confederation of 1643, the Albany Congress of 
1754, and the Stamp Act Congress of 1765.29 Thus, there were a 
variety of sources for empirical data concerning the desirability and 
effectiveness of different aspects of federal structure. 
Besides the wealth of empirical data that could be derived from the 
study of existing political structures, there was a great deal of material 
written by predominantly continental political philosophers in the area 
of natural law and international law from which the Framers could draw. 
Writers such as Montesquieu,30 Emmerich de Vattel,31 and Samuel 
transmitted of this celebrated institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present 
Confederation of the American States."); id. at I 09 ("The Achaean league, as it is called, 
was another society of Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction."); 
id. No. 45, at 298-304 (James Madison) (discussing the Achaean league, the Lycian 
Confederacy, and the feudal system). 
28. Id. No. 19, at 113 (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison)("The examples 
of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper, have not exhausted the source of 
experimental instruction on this subject There are existing institutions, founded on a 
similar principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which presents itself 
is the Gennanic body."); id. at 118 ("If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as 
a government over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of."); id. 
("The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy; though 
it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions."); id. No. 20, at 
119 (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison) ("The United Netherlands are a confeder-
acy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming 
all the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed."); id. at 121 
(discussing the "Belgic confederacy"); id. at 121-22 (discussing the "union of Utrecht''). 
29. See MAx FARRAND, THE FATIIERS OF TIIE CONSTITUTION: A CHRONICLE OF 
TIIE EsTABLISIIMENT OF TIIE UNION 48-51 (1921); SAMUEL A. PLEASANTS, THE 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 4-7 (1968) (discussing the Albany Congress). 
30. CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF TIIE LA ws (Anne M. Cobler et al. 
eds., 1989). 
31. The influence ofVattel on the Founding Generation has been well-documented. 
See, e.g., PEIER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE 
LAW OF NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776-1814, at 5, II (1993)(stating that 
"Vattel enjoyed enonnous prestige and influence in Europe and America" and that 
VattePs Law of Nations "was unrivaled . .. in its influence on the American founders''); 
FRANCIS STEPHEN RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIIE ENLIGHTENMENT 281 (1975) 
("[T]here is a general agreement among scholars that Vattel's influence was widespread, 
and that it was particularly strong in England and in the United States."). Vattel's 
influence in the area of international law was particularly significant: 
A century ago not even the name of Grotius himself was more potent in its 
influence upon questions relating to international law than that of Vattel. 
Vattel's treatise on the law of nations was quoted by judicial tribunals, in 
speeches before legislative assemblies, and in the decrees and correspondence 
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Pufendorf2 discussed various models of political union in their works 
on natural law and the law of nations. The Framers were generally 
familiar with these writings as is evidenced by the frequency with which 
they were cited by the Framers themselves and by courts during the 
Founding Era.33 Therefore, an analysis of these sources may provide 
a valuable background for study of the federal structures established 
under the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation. 
A. Montesquieu's Model: A "Confederate Republic" 
Of the aforementioned writers, Montesquieu's political writings most 
evidently influenced the Framers of the Constitution. For example, 
Alexander Hamilton discussed the views of Montesquieu at length in The 
Federalist No. 9. Hamilton quoted Montesquieu's definition of a 
"confederate republic" as descriptive of the union among the states. 
Both Federalists and Antifederalists often referred to the union among 
the states under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution as a 
"confederate republic."34 According to Montesquieu, 
of executive officials. 
Charles G. Fenwick, The Authority of Valle/, 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1913). See 
also Jesse S. Reeves, The Influence of the Law of Nature upon International Law in the 
United States, 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 547, 549 (1909). Vattel was one of many Continental 
writers who were important in shaping American legal thought: 
At the time of the American Revolution the work ofVattel was the latest and 
most popular if not the most authoritative of the Continental writers. Citations 
of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel are scattered in about equal numbers in the 
writings of the time. Possibly after the Revolution Vattel is quoted more 
frequently than his predecessors. 
Id. For example, Benjamin Franklin stated in reference to Vattel's work, The Law of 
Nations, "'It came to us in good season~ when the circumstances of a rising State make 
it necessary frequently to consult the Law ofNations."' Benjamin Franklin, Introduction 
to EMMERICH DE VA "ITEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR 1HE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
xxx (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758) (quoting2 WHARTON'S THE REVOLtJTION-
ARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 64). It is particularly noteworthy that Franklin 
thought Vattel's writings useful in designing plans of Union for the states in America 
since it is widely recognized that Franklin's plan of Union of 1775 was probably the 
"starting point'' used in drafting the Articles of Confederation. See FARRAND, supra note 
29, at 51. 
32. See Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American 
Constitutions, 102 YALE L.J. 907, 914 n.24 (1993) (noting that during the founding 
period "[t]he arguments of Pufendorf were among the most scholarly of many that 
employed a common vocabulary and mode of analysis. In popularizing a succinct, 
generally stated, and attractive version of the state-of-nature analysis, the briefer works 
of Hutcheson and Pufendorf were particularly important.''). Another writer whose works 
on international law were influential, but whose work is not addressed in this Article is 
Hugo Grotius. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TREs ( I 625) 
( discussing a system of law among states based on natural law). 
33. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
34. See infra notes 200-09 and accompanying text. 
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This form of Government is a Convention by which several smaller States agree 
to become members of a larger one, which they intend to form. It is a kind of 
assembJage of societies, that constitute a new one, capable of encreasing by 
means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be 
able to provide for the security of the united body." 
The value of this type of government was that it would help to guard 
against "popular insurrection" and "external force" while maintaining the 
advantages that small republics provided to the citizenry. Thus, prior to 
ratification of the Articles and the Constitution, political writers had been 
considering the benefits of systems analogous to those established under 
these documents. 
B. Vattel~ Model: Mutual Defense and Commercial Union 
Similarly, Emmerich de Vattel in his treatise, The Law of Nations or 
the Principles of Natural Law, discussed a model of political union 
among states. Vattel thought that the establishment of such a union was 
useful in warding off more powerful states that might divide and conquer 
the smaller ones were they not unified.36 Thus, one of the most 
important virtues of a union or alliance was self-protection. Similar 
concerns were at the forefront of the debate over ratification of the 
Constitution. As Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist No. 7, 
America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, 
offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be 
gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and 
wars; and by the destructive contentions of the parts into which she was 
35. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 50-51 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976) (quoting Montesquieu). 
36. Vattel used the example of the Roman Empire, which grew in large measure 
due to the fact that smaller states did not unify in the face of Roman aggression. Vattel 
stated: 
The example of the Romans is a good lesson for all sovereigns. If the most 
powerful States of that day had united together to watch over the movements 
of Rome, to set limits to her progress, they would not have successively 
become subject to her. But force of arms is not the only means of guarding 
against a formidable State. There are gentler means, which are always lawful. 
The most efficacious of these is an alliance of other less powerful sovereigns, 
who, by uniting their forces, are enabled to counterbalance the sovereign who 
excites their a1ann. Let them be faithful and steadfast in their a1liance, and 
their union will insure the safety of each. 
EMMERICH DE VATIEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
250 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916). 
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divided, would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations of 
powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et impera must be the motto 
of every nation that either hates or fears us.37 
There were potential dangers for the American states from the European 
powers-particularly England, France, and Spain.38 Furthermore, there 
was a concern that if a common union was not established among all of 
the states there would be conflicts among the states themselves. 39 
Thus, self-protection was an important concern of both the Founding 
Generation and Vattel. 
37. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976) (footnote omitted). 
38. There was great concern among the Founding Generation that the European 
powers would overwhelm the colonies were they divided into two or three distinct 
confederations. For example, John Jay stated in The Federalist No. 4, 
Wisely ••• do [the people of America] consider union and a good national 
government as necessary to put and keep them in such a situation [of peace] 
as, instead of inviting war, will tend to repress and discourage it. That 
situation consists in the best possible state of defence, and necessarily depends 
on the government, the arms, and the resources of the country. 
Id. No. 4, at 19. Jay's concern was that: 
If ... [the European powers] find us either destitute of an effectual govern-
ment ( each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), 
or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or 
confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain, 
and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor, pitiful 
figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would she become not 
only to their contempt, but to their outrage. 
Id. at 22. See also id. No. 25, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The territories of Britain, 
Spain, and of the Indian nations in our neighborhood do not border on particular States, 
but encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, 
is therefore common."); id. No. 23, at 142 (Alexander Hamilton) ("The principal 
purposes to be answered by union are these-the common defence of the members; the 
preservation of the public peace, as well against internal convulsions as external 
attacks."); GERSON, supra note 11, at JO 1-07 (describing the dangers to the new republic 
from Great Britain, France, and Spain); PLEASANTS, supra note 29, at 29-31. 
39. Not only was there concern with the European powers, but also that if the 
states formed separate confederacies there would be conflicts among the confederacies. 
See THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 33 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976) 
("'NEIGHBORING NATIONS ... are naturally enemies of each other, unless their common 
weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATIVE REPUBLlC, and their constitution 
prevents the differences that neighborhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy 
which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbors."') 
(quoting Vide, Principes des Negociations par /'Abbe de Mably). Defending against 
potential conflict among the states was viewed as a potential source of liberty-reducing 
measures such as standing annies: 
[l]f we should be disunited, and the integral parts should either remain 
separated, or, which is most probable, should be thrown together into two or 
three confederacies, we should be, in a short course of time, in the predica-
ment of the continental powers of Europe-our liberties would be a prey to the 
means of defending ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other. 
Id. No. 8, at 46 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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However, Vattel certainly did not believe tbat the self-protection 
rationale for establishing a union among states was the sole rationale. 
Vattel thought not only that the defensive capabilities of the member 
states might be strengthened through political union, but also that the 
commercial power of the states might be increased. According to Vattel, 
[States entering a union] have also the right mutually to favor one another, 
to the exclusion of the sovereign whom they fear; and by the privileges of every 
sort, and especially by the commercial privileges which they will mutually grant 
to one another's subjects, and which they will refuse to the subjects of that 
dangerous sovereign, they will add to their strength, and at the same time lessen 
bis, without giving him reason for complaint, since every one may dispose 
freely of his favors." 
Thus, by unifying and establishing reciprocal commercial privileges, 
weaker states might strengthen themselves in the face of stronger 
sovereign powers. Strengthening the commercial relations among the 
states was a second concern of the Founding Generation.41 Therefore, 
the two primary reasons for forming a political union among the states 
were identified by Vattel in his treatise on the law of nations. 
Vattel noted that the states of Europe formed such a political system, 
which he described as a "sort of Republic": 
Europe forms a political system in which the Nations inhabiting this part of 
the world are bound together by their relations and various interests into a 
single body. It is no longer, as in former times, a confused heap of detached 
parts, each of which had but little concern for the lot of the others, and rarely 
troubled itself over what did not immediately affect it The constant attention 
of sovereigns to all that goes on, the custom of resident ministers, the continual 
negotiations that take place, make of modem Europe a sort of Republic, whose 
members-each independent, but all bound together by a common inter-
es!---unite for the maintenance of order and the preservation of libertY. This is 
what has given rise to the well-known principle of the balance of power, by 
which is meant an arrangement of affairs so that no State shall be in a position 
to have absolute mastery and dominate over the others.42 
Thus, Vattel's description of a relatively weak political system among 
the European states may have been one model for the relations among 
the states of North America. The Articles of Confederation were 
40. VATIEL, supra note 36, at 250-51. 
41. See infra notes 118, 121-22. 
42. VATIEL, supra note 36, at 251. 
263 
sometimes referred to as a "mere treaty" between sovereign states.43 
However, the union established under the Articles may have in reality 
gone beyond that of a mere treaty and may even have gone beyond the 
political system of the European states described by Vattel. Vattel 
recognized that sovereign states could form a "confederate republic" in 
which the union among them was much stronger. According to Vattel, 
[A] number of sovereign and independent States may unite to form a 
perpetual confederation, without individually ceasing to be perfect States, 
Together they will form a confederate republic. Their joint resolutions will not 
impair the sovereignty of the individual members, althou§.h its exercise may be 
somewhat restrained by reason of voluntary agreements. 
Thus, Vattel, like Montesquieu, recognized that states could unite 
without completely relinquishing their sovereignty in a closer political 
union, which he also termed a "confederate republic." It is striking that 
the notion of a "confederate republic"--terminology often used to 
describe the government established under the Articles of Confederation 
and the Constitution-was discussed by Vattel and other writers prior to 
ratification of these documents. 
C. Pujendoif's Model: A "Perpetual Treaty" 
Samuel Pufendorf, a noted seventeenth century natural law theorist, 
also described a "system" of sovereign states wishing to preserve their 
"autonomy," united for co=on defense by a "perpetual treaty," in his 
On the Law of Nature and of Nations.45 Pufendorf described such a 
treaty as follows: 
43. See THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead 
Earle ed., 1976) (making a distinction between "a mere treaty, dependent on the good 
faith of the parties" and "a government, which is only another word for POLITICAL 
POWER AND SUPREMACY''). James Madison similarly stated that under tho Articles of 
Confederation, "[t]he federal system •.. wants the great vital principles of a Political 
Cons[ti]rution. Under the fonn of such a Constitution, it is in fact nothing more than 
a treaty of amity of commerce and of alliance, between so many independent and 
Sovereign States." Vices of Political System (Apr.-June 1787), in 9 111E PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 351 (Robert A. Rutland el al. eds., 1962). See also Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. I, 9 (1964) (noting that under the Articles of Confederation "the 
States retained most of their sovereignty, like independent nations bound together only 
by treaties''). 
44. VATIEL, supra note 36, at 12. 
45. 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI Ocro (ON TIIE 
LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS) I 046-48 (James Brown Scott ed., C.H. Oldfather & 
W.A. Oldfather, trans., 1934) (1688). See also Amar, supra note 2, at 1446 
(recognizing that "[u]nder traditional jurisprudence, sovereign states could enter into 
treaties with one another, and might even join together in a perpetual federation, or 
league, without losing their sovereign statusH). 
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[T]here is commonly an agreement that one or other part of the supreme 
sovereignty should be exercised at the consent of all. For a treaty that gives 
rise to a system seems to differ from those treaties which are otherwise most 
commonly drawn up between states, chiefly in this: That in others each people 
of the league agrees to certain mutual performances, yet in such a way that they 
are on no account willing to make the exercise of that part of the sovereignty 
from which those performances flow dependent upon the consent of their 
associates, nor to limit in any degree their complete and unlimited power to 
conduct the affairs of their state. So also simple treaties have usually before 
their eyes only the particular advantage of the different states, as it happens to 
coincide, and do not Rroduce any lasting union in matters which concern the 
chief object of states. 6 
Thus, Pufendorf recognized that in such systems there is a delegation of 
sovereign power from the constituent states to a central entity that 
exercises supreme sovereign power within the sphere of its delegated 
powers. The idea of the Articles of Confederation and of the Constitu-
tion----0f dividing the sovereignty of states between a central entity and 
the sovereign states composing the union---was therefore not novel with 
the Framers.47 
46. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 45, at 1047. Alexander Hamilton noted the 
prevalence of such leagues in The Federalist No. 15. According to Hamilton, 
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance 
between independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in 
a treaty regulating all the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity; 
leaving nothing to future discretion; and depending for its execution on the 
good faith of the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized 
nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of observance and 
non-observance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. 
In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe 
for this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly 
hoped for benefits which were never realized. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 90 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
47. There was some contention during the ratification debates that it was not 
possible to divide sovereignty between two entities. See, e.g., Benjamin Rush, Speech 
in the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (Dec. 3, 1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HisrORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 458 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (stating that 
"a plurality of sovereigns is political idolatry"); Thomas Tredwell, Speech in the New 
York Ratifying Convention (July 2, 1788), in 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 403 (Jonathan Elliot 
ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS] (''The 
idea of two distinct sovereigns in the same country, separately possessed of sovereign 
and supreme power, in the same matters at the same time, is as supreme an absurdity, 
as that two distinct separate circles can be bounded exactly by the same circumfer-
ence."). See also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (noting that it is an "axiom 
that, under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the 
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Under such a perpetual treaty there was a more permanent and close 
relation among the constituent states than was found in ordinary treaties. 
Pufendorf stated that, unlike simple treaties among states, 
[t]he case is entirely different with the treaties that appear in systems, the 
purpose of which is that distinct states may intertwine for all time the prime 
interests of their safety, and on that score make the exercise of certain parts of 
the supreme sovereignty depend upon the mutual consent of their associates. 
For there is a great difference between "I will bring you aid in this war, and we 
will consider in concert how we shall attack the enemy'', and "No one of us 
who have entered this society will exercise his right of peace and war, save 
with the common consent of all.',48 
Thus, Pufendorf made a sharp distinction between simple treaties of the 
sort that were commonly found among states in the international arena 
and "perpetual treaties," which established "systems" among states and 
under which the sovereignty of the states was divided. He also 
enunciated a principle of unanimity for collective decision-making--a 
principle that was employed in certain cases under the Articles of 
Confederation. 49 
Despite acknowledging that in systems based on perpetual treaties 
there was a division of sovereignty between the central government and 
the constituent states, Pufendorf recognized that in such systems there 
would be certain areas of the states' original sovereignty that remained 
to be exercised by the states alone: 
We have said that in treaties of this kind [perpetual treaties J the exercise of 
only certain parts of the supreme sovereignty is made to depend upon the 
consent of the associated states. For it hardly seems likely that the affairs of 
several states could be so closely interwoven that it would be to the advantage 
of one and all of them that no part of the supreme sovereignty be exercised 
without the consent of all. Or if there were any such, it would have been more 
to their advantage to unite in one state than to be joined only by a treaty. 
Therefore, it is convenient that the individual states reserve for themselves 
liberty in the exercise of those pans of supreme sovereignty, the manner of 
conducting which is of little or no interest, at least directly, to the rest The 
same is true as well of such business as is of daily occurrence, or wiH not suffer 
tl1e delay consequent upon a discussion of it with others. But matters upon 
which the safety of the entire league depends may with entire fairness be 
considered in common counciJ. so 
Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause"); 
Amar, supra note 24, at 1063 (concluding that "[d]ivided sovereignty was almost 
universally recognized as a theoretical impossibility"). However, as the materials from 
Pufendorf and other political writers i1lustrate, such a concept was not entirely novel. 
48. 2 i>uFENDORF, supra note 45, at 1047. 
49. See infra note 157 and accompanying text 
50. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 45, at 1047. 
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The division of powers, therefore, seems to be based roughly on an 
allocation of the power to provide collective goods to the general 
government, while leaving the day-to-day conduct of most affairs to the 
member states. 
Pufendorf, however, was more specific in delineating the lines of 
division. Pufendorf continued his discussion of perpetual treaties that 
established systems of states by enumerating some of the powers over 
which the central authority would exercise sovereignty and those over 
which the constituent states would retain sovereignty. The list is striking 
in its resemblance to the enumerated powers schemes found in the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution." Pufendorf first 
enumerated some of the powers commonly delegated to the central 
authority: 
Of these war occupies the first place, both defensive and offensive, and that 
wherewith it is drawn to a close, even peace. To which should be joined taxes, 
in so far as they minister to war, and treaties with foreign powers looking to the 
common safety. Here also belongs the consideration that, if any controversy 
arises between the allies themselves" the others who have no direct interest in 
it may at once interpose as mediators, and not allow it to come to open 
warfare.52 
Thus, the power of taxation was divided between the member states and 
the central government, while the powers of making treaties and 
engaging in war were delegated to the central government. Although the 
treaty- and war-making powers were left to the general government 
under the Articles and the Constitution, Pufendorf's concurrent power of 
taxation was not adopted until after ratification of the Constitution. 53 
Similarly, Pufendorf enumerated certain areas that were better left to the 
states: 
[C]ommercial treaties, taxes which are required for the needs of the individual 
states, the appointment of magistrates, laws, the right over citizens of life and 
death, matters of religion, and the like, can without difficulty be left in the 
province of the individual states. Although every state will so control them that 
they will in no way disturb the entire system. From this it is evident that one 
or another of the allies cannot be prevented by the rest :from exercising at their 
51. See infra notes 89-I02 and accompanying text. 
52. 2 l'uFENDORF, supra note 45, at 1047-48. 
53. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
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ovm pleasure those parts of the supreme sovereignty on the conduct of which 
by common counsel there was no special agreement in the treaty. 54 
Thus, Pufendorf's model of political union under a perpetual treaty is 
somewhat more integrated than that presented by Vattel. Under 
Pufendorf's model there is actually a ceding of sovereignty by the states 
in areas of common interest. Pufendorf's model therefore most closely 
resembles that of the Articles of Confederation under which there was 
such a ceding of sovereignty in certain areas to the Confederation 
Congress through an enumerated powers structure. ss However, as the 
above passage illustrates, he certainly contemplated that the local affairs 
of governing the citizenry would be reserved to the individual states and 
that, in general, a principle that whatever was not delegated to the 
general government was reserved to the member states would govern 
interpretation of the treaty of union. Finally, it is interesting to note that 
Pufendorf appears to leave the power over commerce to the individual 
states. Thls similarity to the Articles of Confederation was abandoned 
with ratification of the Constitution under which the general government 
was delegated the power to rewlate commerce and the states were 
prohibited from levelling tariffs. 6 
III. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS: COMPARISON OF TIIE CONSTITUTION AND 
TIIE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
The experience of the young nation under the Articles of Confedera-
tion helped to shape the emerging Constitution. 57 The Articles served 
54. 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 45, at 1048. It is interesting to note tliat the power 
of taxation was granted to the general government only under the Constitution and was 
made concurrent with the states. See THE FEDERALIST No. 34, at 209 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976) ("The convention thought the concurrent 
jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident that it has at least the merit 
of reconciling an indefinite constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government 
with an adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their own 
necessities."}. 
55. James Madison characterized the union under the Articles of Confederation as 
a "league or treaty" in The Federalist No. 43, arguing that 11[a] compact between 
independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend 
to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties.'' THE FEDERALIST No. 
43, at 288 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
56. See infra notes 121-22 and accompanying text 
57. For a discussion of the period under which the Articles of Confederation were 
in force and the way in which the experience under the Articles influenced the drafting 
of the Constitution, see FARRAND, supra note 29; FISKE, supra note 11; GERSON, supra 
note 11; HOFFERT, supra note 2; MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
(1970); MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 
DURING THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789 (1950); ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, THB 
CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1963); PLEASANTS, supra note 29; GORDON 
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as a template from which the Constitution was derived. Many of the 
provisions of the Articles were preserved in slightly modified form under 
the Constitution-particularly those provisions that established the 
federal structure.58 Despite these great similarities, the Constitution did 
contain certain innovations relevant to the federal structure distinguishing 
it from the Articles.59 The Constitution delegated a few additional 
enumerated powers to the general gove=ent. However, this was not 
a major structural change. The real innovation under the Constitution 
was that it represented a compact among the people as well as the states, 
while the Articles had been a compact solely among the states as entities. 
S. WOOD, THE CONFEDERATION AND Tiffi CONSTITIITION: THE CRITICAL ISSUES (1973). 
58. See supra note I and accompanying text. 
59. Many innovations found in the Constitution were aimed at the structure of the 
general government itself. For example, bicameralism was introduced into the legislative 
structure under Article I of the Constitution. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 2 (establishing 
the House of Representatives); id. § 3 (establishing the Senate). Furthermore, a separate 
Judicial Branch was established under Article Ill. U.S. CONST. art. III ("The judicial 
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."); THE FEDERALIST 
No. 22, at 138 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976) ("A circumstance 
which crowns the defects of the Confederation remains yet to be mentioned,---the want 
of a judiciary power."). A separate Executive Branch was established under Article II. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § I (''The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America."). 
The Articles did contain some proto-executive and judicial structures. For example, 
the Articles provided for adjudication of certain disputes among the states by Congress. 
They also contained a "Committee of the States," which functioned as a sort of executive 
organ. This structure was preceded in an earlier draft of the articles by a Council of 
State, which possessed greater authority and whose powers were discussed in a separate 
article. See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CoNTINENTAL CONGRESS 546-54, art. XIX (Gov't 
Printing Office 1906) (listing numerous specified powers of the Council of State); 
JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 57, at 178-79 (discussing the 
Council of State in the Dickinson draft of the Articles). The fact that the Confederation 
Congress construed the enumerated powers broadly may have led to structures that were 
very similar to those that were explicitly adopted in the Constitution. As one 
commentator has noted, 
[1]he overall structure of the government chartered by the Constitution was 
similar in many respects to the one that already existed under the Articles. A 
national legislature already engaged actively in the creation of national laws, 
treaties and policies; a national court of appeals, the institutional predecessor 
of the Supreme Court, rendered judgments superior ,vithin its jurisdiction to 
state court decisions; and federal administrative departments carried the 
national will into execution. 
Eric M. Freedman, Note, The United States and the Articles of Confederation: Drifting 
Toward Anarchy or Inching Toward Commonwealth?, 88 YALE L.J. 142, 164 (1978) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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The political authority supporting the general government was derived 
from both the states and the people under the Constitution, whereas 
previously under the Articles it had been derived from only the states as 
entities. Both the Articles and the Constitution established compound 
republics, but the Constitution represented a partial consolidation. A 
number of textual provisions illustrate the validity of this characteriza-
tion. This Part examines these structural similarities and differences 
between the Constitution and the Articles. 
A. Structural Similarities 
It is not surprising that there should be many similarities in the text of 
the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. Not only were many 
of the individuals responsible for drafting the Articles involved in 
drafting the Constitution,60 but also the nation did not desire a complete 
overhaul of the Articles-only amendment.61 The Confederation 
Congress had limited the Convention to "the sole and express purpose 
of revising the Articles of Confederation."62 As a result, many 
structural provisions in the Constitution are similar to those found in the 
Articles. Both documents created political unions of the states; both 
ensured reciprocity among the states under their fourth articles; both 
employed an enumerated powers scheme in dividing the respective 
spheres of the general and state governments, with the states retaining 
residual powers; both provided safeguards for the continued existence of 
the states as entities; and both established the supremacy of federal law. 
Thus, the textual similarities extend to many of the most fundamental 
provisions establishing the federal system. 
1. Formation of a Union 
Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution represented 
federal systems in which sovereign states were joined in some sort of 
60. FARRAND, supra note 11, at 39. 
61. The desire to merely amend the Articles is evidenced in statements made 
during the debates over ratification of the Constitution. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES IN TIIE 
SEVERAL STA'IE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 278 (remarks of William Grayson at 
the Virginia Convention) ("I would recommend that the present Confederation should 
be amended. Give Congress the regulation of commerce."); 4 id. at 70 (remarks of 
Timothy Bloodworth at the North Carolina Convention) (stating that "he was for giving 
power to Congress to regulate the trade of the United States"); 2 id. at 80 (remarks of 
General Thompson at the Massachusetts Convention) ("Let us amend the old 
Confederation. Why not give Congress power only to regulate trade?"). 
62. 3 RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 14. 
270 
[VOL. 34: 249, 1997] Two Federal Stn,ctures 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
union.63 For example, the title of the Articles itself is "The Articles of 
Confederation and Perpetual Union Between the States . . . . " The 
Articles thus seemed to contemplate the sort of perpetual treaty, or 
league, of which Pnfendorf spoke in discussing systems of states.64 
Article III elaborated on the nature of the union, stating that the "states 
hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship" and continued by 
enumerating the purposes of the league among the states, which included 
"common defence" and securing the states' "liberties and their mutual 
and general welfare."6' Thus, much as the Constitution purported to 
ensure the general welfare of the people, the Articles ensured the general 
welfare of the states-indicating that the league established under the 
Articles was among states, rather than a compact to which the people 
directly were parties. Further evidence of the nature of the union under 
the Articles is to be found in the fact that the Articles were to be 
approved by the legislatures of the states, rather than directly by the 
people themselves.66 Thus, the source of the political authority . 
63. As one commentator has noted, "[t]he most intriguing dimension of the 
Articles of Confederation is its simultaneous commitment to the pursuit of sovereign 
statehood and to a perpetual union of states." HOFFERT, supra note 2, at 35. Similarly, 
Gordon Wood, in his important work on the Constitution, noted: 
What is truly remarkable about the Confederation is the degree of union that 
was achieved. The equality of the citizens of all states in privileges and 
immunities, the reciprocity of extradition and judicial proceedings among the 
states . . . , the elimination of travel and discriminatory trade restrictions 
between states, and the substantial grant of powers to the Congress in Article 
9 made the league of states as cohesive and strong as any similar son of 
republican confederation in history--stronger in fact than some Americans had 
expected. 
WOOD, supra note I, at 359. 
64. See supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text. 
65. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION an. Ill. A previous draft of the Articles 
provided that "[t]he said Colonies unite themselves so as never to be divided by any Act 
whatever, and hereby several enter into a firm League of Friendship with each other . 
. . . " 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 546-54, art. II. 
This wording emphasized the perpetual nature of the union among the states. However, 
the language was dropped. The language might have been thought to be redundant or 
perhaps inaccurate-a broader right of seccession may have been contemplated. Even 
though this language was presen~ this draft allowed for amendment on the same temlS 
as the final draft. See id. art. II, para. 2. 
66. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII, para. 2 ("These articles shall be 
proposed to the legislatures of all the United States, to be considered, and if approved 
of by them, they are advised to authorize their delegates to ratify the same in the 
Congress of the United States; which being done, the same shall become conclusive."). 
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establishing the general government under the Articles was to be found 
in the states alone. 
In contrast, the Constitution proclaimed in its Preamble that the 
"People of the United States" established the Constitution "in Order to 
form a more perfect Union."67 Promotion of the general welfare and 
the blessings of liberty was not stated in terms of the states, as under the 
Articles, but rather in terms of "ourselves and our Posterity."68 
However, to a large extent the states as entities retained the role that 
they enjoyed under the Articles. Thus, the Constitution was to be a 
union not only of the states, conceived of as entities, but also of the 
people of the United States. 
2. Reciprocity Among the States 
A second important commonality between the Articles of Confedera-
tion and the Constitution that helps to establish the federal system is 
67. U.S. CONST. pmbl. Forrest McDonald has argued that the "We the People" 
language of the preamble was understood as "We the People of the Several States." See 
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS 0RDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECWAL 0RJG!NS OF TilE 
CONSTITUTION 280-81 (1985). Farrand's analysis also indicates that the "We the 
People" language was used as a matter of convenience. According to Farrand, 
The articles of confederation formed an agreement "between the States of 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, .•• " and the rest of the 
thirteen. At one stage of the development of its report, the committee of detail 
tried in the preamble "We the People of and the States of New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island," etc., but later the "and" was dropped out. 
When the committee of style took up this point they found themselves 
confronted with a new difficulty. The convention had voted that the new 
constitution might be ratified by nine states and should go into effect between 
the states so ratifying, and no human power could name those states in 
advance. How far this was the controlling factor and what other motives may 
have been at work, we have no record. The simple fact remains that the 
committee of style cleverly avoided the difficulty before them by phrasing the 
preamble:-''We, the People of the United States." 
FARRAND, supra note 11, at 190-91. However, even if such an interpretation of the 
preamble is incorrect, the Constitution did represent a compact among both the people 
and the states as entities. See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text The preamble 
may have merely been reiterating the proposition that in republican governments all 
political power was ultimately derived ftom the people. 
68. U.S. CONST. pmbl. The fact that the preamble did not explicitly mention the 
states may have been the result of the fact that the Convention was not sure which states 
would end up ratifying the Constitution. The preamble approved by the Convention 
before sending the Constitution to the Committee of Style had read: "We the People of 
the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, 
Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, 
North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia .... " 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 565. However, the Committee of Style revised this 
language, perhaps over a concern that not all of the states would ratify the Constitution. 
See FARRAND, supra note 11, at 190-91. 
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found in Article IV of the respective documents. 69 This article served 
to establish a federal system by allowing for the free movement of not 
only people, but also property among the several states.70 The right of 
entry among states established under Article IV has been recognized as 
a valuable mechanism for preserving individual liberties.71 Article IV 
of the Articles ensured that "free inhabitants of each" of the states would 
"be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the 
several states."72 It further ensured that "the people of each state shall 
69. See PLEASANTS, supra note 29, at 45 (''The delegates at Philadelphia were 
greatly influenced by Article IV of the Articles of Confederation. In fact they adopted 
much of its language for the fourth article of the new Constitution."). See also Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet) 519, 526 (1839) ("The Constitution of the United 
States was formed to establish a national government • . . . The great object of the 
Constitution was to erect a government for commercial purposes, for mutual intercourse, 
and mutual dealing. The prosperity of every state could alone be promoted and secured 
by establishing these on principles of reciprocity; and on the security and protection of 
the citizens of each state, in all the states uoited by the government."). 
70. Evidently, despite the scholarly consensus that the Articles of Confederation 
established a weak central government there was a great deal achieved in the way of 
comity among the several states uoder the Articles. For example, Merrill Jensen came 
to the following conclusions concerning commerce among the states after examining 
newspapers from the era of the Articles: 
[f]he picture by the end of 1787 is not the conventional one of interstate trade 
barriers, but a novel one of reciprocity between state and state. American 
goods were free of duties, and foreign goods arriving in American ships were 
charged lower duties in most of the states than when brought in in foreign 
ships, and particularly, in the ships of non-treaty countries. Cooperation 
between the states extended to other matters than trade. Ancient disputes 
about boundaries and navigation rights were discussed and settled rapidly . ... 
The usual procedure was for the states concerned to appoint commissioners, 
and, once these had agreed, for the legislatures to adopt the agreemen4 a 
process still followed as problems arise among American states. 
JENSEN, THE NEW NATION, supra note 57, at 342. 
71. See Richard B. Stewart Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REv. 917, 923 
(I 985) ("fhe federal right to exit to another state or locality provides an important 
safeguard against local oppression, reducing the need for national intervention."); see 
also Charles M. Tiebout A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956) (arguing that jurisdictions will compete for citizens and that social welfare may 
be maximized by allowing citizens to choose among jurisdictions). 
72. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, para. I. The Privileges and lmmuoities 
provision of the Articles of Confederation was an amalgamation of two separate articles 
found in an earlier draft. In the Dickinson draft, Articles VI and VII read as follows: 
ART. VI. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth always have the 
same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, hrununities and Advantages, in the other 
Colonies, which the said Inhabitants now have, in all Cases whatever, except 
in those provided for by the next following Article. 
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have free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy 
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same 
duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereofrespective-
ly."73 The article included an Extradition Clause that ensured that upon 
demand of the governor or executive power of the state from which a 
fugitive fled, the fugitive would be "delivered up and removed to the 
state having jurisdiction of his offense."74 Finally, the article provided 
that "Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the 
records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of 
every other state."75 Thus, the Articles provided for interstate comi-
ty76 with respect to the rights of citizenship, commercial privileges, and 
ART. VII. The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all the Rights, Liberties, 
Privileges, Immunities, and Advantages, in Trade, Navigation, and Commerce, 
in any other Colony, and in going to and from the same from and to any Part 
of the World, which the Natives of such Colony [or any Commercial Society, 
established by its Authority shall] enjoy. 
5 JOURNALS OF nm CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 546-47. 
73. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, para. 1. 
14. Id. art. IV, para. 2. 
15. Id. art. IV, para. 3. 
76. In general, the principles of international comity were well-enunciated prior to 
ratification of the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution by political writers such 
as Vattel and Grotius. There were certain rights that commentators thought must be 
respected among nations as part of the "law of nations." As the Court noted in Bank of 
Augusta v. Earle: 
The term "comity" is taken from the civil law. Vattel has no distinct 
chapter upon that head. But the doctrine is laid down bY other authorities with 
sufficient distinctness, and in effect by him. It is, in general tenns, that there 
are, between nations at peace with one another, rights, both natural and 
individual, resulting from the comity or courtesy due from one friendly nation 
to another. Among these, is the right to sue in their Courts respectively; the 
right to travel in each other's dominions; the right to pursue one's vocation in 
trade; the right to do all things, generally, which belong to the citizens proper 
of each country, and which are not precluded from doing by some positive law 
of the state. Among these rights, one of the clearest is the right of a citizen 
of one nation to take away his property from the territory of any other friendly 
nation, without molestation or objection. This is what we call the comity of 
nations. It is the usage of nations, and has become a positive obligation on all 
nations. 
38 U.S. (13 Pet) 519, 556-57 (1839). In his work on the conflict oflaws, Justice Story 
explained the principles of international comity as expressed by Huber: That laws have 
no force beyond the territorial jurisdiction of a state; persons within a given jurisdiction 
"whether their residence is pennanent or temporary" are subject to the laws of the 
jurisdiction; and nations and states "from comity admit" that the laws of other nations 
and states ought to "have the same force every where" as long as "they do not prejudice 
the power or rights of other governments, or of their citizens." This fonn of voluntary 
comity was not derived from civil or natural law, but rather out of convenience. See 
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON nm CONFLICT OF LAWS 30 (1st ed. 1834). The flaw 
with this variety of comity was that it "is, and ever must be, uncertain. That it must 
necessarily depend on a variety of circumstances, which cannot be reduced to any certain 
rule." Id. at 29. 
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judicial proceedings, much like the systems discussed by writers such as 
Montesquieu, Vattel, and Pufendorf. However, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation went beyond such 
voluntary recognition of principles of international comity because it 
mandated recognition of certain rights-the privileges and immunities of 
citizens-and because some of the rights to be recognized were not 
voluntarily recognized as rights of foreign citizens visiting the United 
States. As such, it was a fundamental element of the compact among 
the states.77 
Article IV of the Constitution contains similar provisions. The article 
begins with a Full Faith and Credit Clause containing wording similar 
to that of the Articles of Confederation.78 The Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of the Constitution is greatly simplified, providing that "[t]he 
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities 
of Citizens in the several States."79 Alexander Hamilton termed this 
77. As the Supreme Court noted in Bank of Augusta v. Earle: 
Comity . . . is international courtesy; never allowed between provinces, 
districts, counties, cities, or other parts of the same empire. The connexion 
between these United States is closer and more intimate than that of comity. 
Their union by federal compact expressly settles the relation of the states to 
each other, and leaves no room for tacit or constructive comity to operate . ... 
An article of the Constitution provides for the force and proof of public acts 
of state, for the privileges and immunities of the citizens of each state in all 
the rest, for fugitives from justice and fugitives from Jabour; leaving little or 
nothing on this important subject to judicial construction. 
38 U.S. (13 Pel) at 569-70. The scope of the protection was broadened to include all 
of the rights of citizenship. The clauses, in effect, mandated that the states recognize 
citizens of other states as citizens of their own states and not deny them the rights of 
citizenship that belong to their own citizens. See ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF TIIB UNITED STATES 127-28 (1935); see also Peter s. 
Onuf, The First Federal Constitution: The Articles of Confederation, in THE FRAMING 
AND RATIFICATION OF TIIE CONSTITUTION 82 (Leonard w. Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney 
eds., 1987) (noting that Jonathan Witherspoon conceived of the confederation as a more 
perfect form of the international system). 
78. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § I. One change is the inclusion of a congressional 
power of prescribing "the Manner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall 
be proved, and the Effect thereof." Id. 
79. Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. I. Charles Pinckney, who is probably responsible for this 
clause, stated in a Jetter written in 1787 that "[!]he 4th article, respecting the extending 
[ of] the rights of the Citizens of each State, throughout the United States ..• is formed 
exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the present Confederation •..• " Charles 
Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention, 
In Philadelphia, on the 28th of May, 1787, reprinted in 3 RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 112. Thus, the parallel between the Articles and the 
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provision "the basis of the Union"80 because it placed all citizens on an 
equal footing with resident citizens when travelling in foreign states. 
The Constitution differed from the Articles only insofar as it contained 
an improved mechanism for enforcing this provision through a national 
judiciary that would preside over conflicts among citizens of different 
states.81 The article also contains an Extradition Clause,82 supplement-
ed by a Fugitive Slave Clause having similar wording. 83 Section 3 of 
Article IV was an innovation, containing provisions governing the 
admission of new states and the joining and splitting of states, requiring 
the consent of the state legislatures as well as Congress,84 and provid-
Constitution was recognized by the Founders. Furthermore, this provision was adopted 
with almost no debate. See id. at 437. For a discussion of the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause, see generally Chester James Antieau, Paul's Pe111erted Privileges or the 
True Meaning a/the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. I (1967); David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 
37 CASE W. RES. L. REY. 794 (1987). 
80. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 518 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976). 
81. See U.S. CONST. art. III. Alexander Hamilton noted the importance of a 
national judiciary to the enforcement of this clause in The Federalist No. 80. Hamilton 
argued, 
[l]f it be a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of 
executing its own provisions by its own authority, it will follow, that in order 
to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to 
which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought 
to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another 
State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision 
against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should 
be committed to that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be 
likely to be impartial between the different States and their citizens, and 
which, owing its official existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel 
any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded. 
THE FEDERALlST No. 80, at 518-19 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
!976). 
82. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. 
83. Id. art. N, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under 
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation 
therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim 
of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."). 
84. Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. I (''New States may be admitted by the Congress into this 
Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other 
State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, 
without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the 
Congress."). The Articles of Confederation did contemplate the expansion of the 
Confederacy. For example, Article XI provided for the addition of Canada to the Union. 
See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XI. However, as James Madison noted in The 
Federalist No. 43, Congress was forced to assume a power that was not delegated due 
to the omission of such a power in the Articles. Madison stated: "The eventual 
establishment of new States seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of [the 
Articles]. \Ve have seen the inconvenience of this omission, and the assumption of 
power into which Congress have been led by it With great propriety, therefore, has the 
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ing for congressional regulation of the territories.85 Thus, a mechanism 
was put into place for the general government to regulate the formation 
of new states, protecting the stability of the federal structure. The final 
innovation was the inclusion of the Guarantee Clause in Section 4. This 
clause may be viewed as similarly protecting the stability of the federal 
system by delegating to the general government a power to ensure that 
states with only certain types of governments exist within the union.86 
Finally, it is interesting to note that both the Constitution and the 
Articles prevented the states from entering into treaties with each other 
without the consent of Congress. The Articles provided: ''No two or 
more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation or alliance whatever 
between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress 
assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to 
be entered into, and how long it shall continue."87 Similarly, the 
Constitution provided that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress, ... Compact with another State .... "88 Such prohibitions 
served to ensure that the structure established under the Constitution and 
the Articles was not disturbed through further contracting among the 
states. 
new system supplied the defect" THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 281 (James Madison) 
(Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
85. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of 
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as 
to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State."). Of this 
power, Madison stated: "This is a power of very great importance, and required by 
considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the [power of Congress to 
create new states]." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 281 (James Madison) (Edward Mead 
Earle ed., 1976). 
86. See infra notes 142-56 and accompanying text 
87. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art VI, para. 2. An earlier draft of the Articles 
also contained such a provision. See 5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 
supra note 59, at 546-54, art V. 
88. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cl. 3. James Madison quickly dismissed discussion 
of this provision, stating "(t]he prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations 
makes a part of the existing articles of Union; and for reasons which need no 
explanation, is copied into the new Constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 289 
(James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
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3. A General Government of Enumerated Powers 
A third structural similarity between the Articles of Confederation and 
the Constitution is that the general governments under both documents 
were designed to be governments of enumerated powers, much like the 
political union described by Pufendorf. Under Article IX of the Articles, 
the United States Congress was delegated the sole and exclusive powers 
to determine the conditions of peace, to declare war, to send and receive 
ambassadors, to enter into treaties and alliances, to establish rules for 
legal confiscations and their appropriation, to grant letters of marque and 
reprisal in times of peace, to appoint courts to try piracy and high seas 
felonies, to determine appeals in cases of captures,89 to hear appeals of 
land disputes between the states,9° to set the alloy and value of coins 
struck through its own action or those of the states, to fix standards of 
weights and measures, to manage trade and other affairs with Indians not 
in any state, to establish a post office and postage system, to appoint 
officers of land forces except for regimental officers and naval officers, 
to manage the regulation and direction of all land and naval forces,91 
to borrow money and emit bills of credit, to build a navy,92 and to 
determine all expenses for common defense and general welfare.93 
This enumeration of powers is similar to that found in Article I, Section 
8 of the Constitution. In fact, the similarity between the two documents 
is striking.94 New enumerated powers included the power to tax,95 the 
89. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IX, para. 1. 
90. Id. art. IX, para. 2. 
91. Id. art. IX, para. 4. 
92. Id. art. IX, para. 5. 
93. Id. art. IX, para. 4. See also id. art. II (stating that all powers that were not 
"expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled" were reserved to the 
states). 
94. James Madison emphasized the great amount of power exercised by the 
Confederation Congress in The Federalist No. 38 where he stated: 
The present Congress can make requisitions to any amount they please, and 
the States are constitutionally bound to furnish them; they can emit bills of 
credit as long as they will pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and 
at home, as long as a shilling will be lent Is an indefinite power to raise 
troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power also; and 
they have already begun to make use of it . . . The existing Congress, 
without any such control, can make treaties which they themselves have 
declared, and most of the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the 
land. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 38, at 240 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). The 
Constitution in many cases improved the mechanisms through which the general 
government could exercise its enumerated powers. As one commentator bas noted, 
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means of carrying them out or of compelling compliance. It could not directly 
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power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce,96 the power to 
establish uniform rules concerning bankruptcy and naturalization,97 to 
grant patents,98 and to establish inferior courts.'9 Importantly, the 
congressional power to coin money was effectively made exclusive and 
a national currency established under the Constitution through provisions 
prohibiting the states from coining their own money and emitting bills 
of credit under Article I, Section I 0. 100 Despite the addition of some 
tax or legislate upon individuals; it had no explicit "legislative" or "govern-
mental" power to make binding "law" enforceable as such in state courts; it 
lacked authority to set up its own general courts; and it could raise troops and 
money only by urequisitioning" contributions from each state. On paper, such 
requisitions were "binding." In fact, they were mere requests. 
Amar, supra note 2, at 1447. This evaluation of the powers of Congress may 
overestimate the wealmess of the central government. However, it does usefully point 
out that there were improvements made in the mechanisms for exercise of congressional 
powers under the Constitution. 
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. 
96. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
97. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
98. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. According to Madison, "[t)he utility of this power will 
scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great 
Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal 
reason to belong to the inventors." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 279 (James Madison) 
(Ed,vard Mead Earle ed., I 976). 
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
I 00. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. This power was effectively made exclusive since under 
Article I, Section 10, a state could not "coin money; emit bills of credit; [or] make 
anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts .... " Id. § 10, cl. I. 
Historically under the Articles there had been problems with both the states and the 
general government printing money, which then lost most of its value. As James 
Madison noted, 
The loss which America has sustained since the peace from the pestilent 
effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on 
the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and morals of 
the people and on the character of republican government, constitutes an 
enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, 
which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which 
can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntaJy sacrifice on the altar of 
justice of the power which has been the instrwnent of it 
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 290 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earl ed., 1976). See 
also FARRAND, supra note 29, at 88-90 (noting the rise of "paper money parties" that 
captured state legislatures); GERSON, supra note II, at 46-50 (noting the rampant 
inflation of this period). 
The prohibition on the states against emitting bills of credit, like the delegation of a 
federal power to regulate interstate commerce, was a further attempt to unify the United 
States commercially. See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 290 (James Madison) (Edward 
Mead Earle ed., 1976) (noting that "[b)ad every State a right to regulate the value of its 
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significant new powers, however, the vast majority of the powers 
delegated to Congress w;ider the Constitution were available to Congress 
under the Articles. Furthermore, the Confederation Congress had 
construed their enumerated powers broadly and had exercised powers 
that were arguably not expressly delegated, such as creating a national 
bank and regulating the Northwest Territories. IOI 
coin, there might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the intercourse 
among them would be impeded"). For example, in Briscoe v. Bank of Kemuc!..y, it was 
argued by counsel that 
[t]he separation of all these powers of coining; issuing bills; making legal 
tenders; fixing standards; and the bestowal of them on the Union, to the total 
exclusion of the states; was indispensably necessary to accomplish the great 
ends for which the constitution was formed. Its leading object was to make 
the people, one people, for many purposes; and especial1y as to the currency, 
One, so far as to the high immunities and privileges of free citizens are 
concerned. One, in the rights of holding, purchasing and transferring property. 
One, in the privilege of changing dornicil and residence at pleasure. One, in 
the modes and means of transacting business and commerce. It intended to 
break down the divisions between the states; so far, if you please, and so far 
only, as to remove an obstacles to intercourse and dealing between their 
respective citizens. To do this, one currency was necessary. 
36 U.S.(! I Pet) 257, 289 (1837). This conception of one political community and the 
substantive set of primarily commercial rights accompanying the union of the people was 
tied to the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article N, Section 2. 
[A Uniform national] currency was altogether proper and indispensable, 
under a system, which for the first time, in the history of free governments, 
established it as a fundamental principle that "the citizens of each state shall 
be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.0 
It was impossible to cany out this principle without it. 
Id. at 290. It is interesting to note that it appears that an early draft of the Articles of 
Confederation had made the power of coining money exclusive in the general 
government, providing that "The United States assembled shall have the sole and 
exclusive Right and Power of ... Coining Money and regulating the Value thereof • 
• • • " S JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 546-54, art. 
XVIII. 
IO I. See Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the 
Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. 
HIST. REV. SI I, 529 (1925) (noting that the Articles of Confederation ''might easily have 
come to support an even greater structure of derived powers than the Constitution of the 
United States does at this moment''). Professor Currie, in particular, has noted the 
apparent illegitimacy of Congress' passage of the Northwest Ordinance: 
The most arresting feature of [the Northwest] Ordinance was the audacity of 
the Continental Congress in enacting it at all. One searches the Articles in 
vain to find even the slimmest reed to support the power of Congress to adopt 
such a measure. Yet under the Ordinance a federal territory was set up and 
governed with general acquiescence. 
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 
1789-1791, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. 775, 842 (1994). See also Freedman, supra note 59, at 
I 62-65; MAJOR PROBLEMS, supra note I I, at 389-90 (noting that the general government 
under the Articles "shared much in common with the [government under the] 
Constitution and was by no means its opposite . . . . In reality~ strong continuities ran 
between the two governments"). 
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The similarity between the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution is noteworthy because it was certainly not necessary to 
employ an enumerated powers structure in dividing the sphere of the 
general gove=ent from that of the states. For example, delegates to 
the Constitutional Convention twice voted for vesting Congress with a 
more general legislative power, and the Vrrginia Plan specified "[t]hat 
the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative 
rights vested in Congress by the confederation; and moreover [t]o 
legislate in all cases, to which the separate States are incompetent . . . 
or in which the harmony of the united States may be interrupted by 
exercise of individual legislation."102 Therefore, other mechanisms for 
dividing power were possible. Both the Articles and the Constitution 
divided power between the states and the general gove=ent by listing 
the powers that were to be exercised by the general gove=ent. 
Furthermore, they both rejected the functionalist approach of defining the 
powers of the general gove=ent in terms of the "competence" of the 
state gove=ents. Finally, under both documents the legislative power 
of the general gove=ent was limited-a general legislative power was 
not delegated to the general gove=ent. Thus, it is significant that such 
similar enumerated powers structures were chosen for the general 
gove=ents under the Articles and under the Constitution. 
4. Residual Powers Retained by the States 
A fourth interesting similarity between the Articles and the Constitu-
tion is that both documents reserved to the states all powers not 
delegated to the general gove=ent, much like the system established 
under Pufendorf's perpetual treaty. Although the original Constitution 
did not have an explicit textual provision that declared that the states or 
the people retained residual powers, the Tenth Amendment made the 
reservation of residual powers to the states explicit. 103 Originally, such 
an explicit textual declaration may not have been thought to be necessary 
since the reservation of powers might be easily deduced from the 
102. I RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 47. 
103. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people."}. 
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delegation of only enumerated powers to the general government.104 
For example, Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 32 that 
"the State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty 
which they before had, and which were not ... exclusively delegated 
to the United States."'05 
Article II of the Articles of Confederation stated that the states 
retained "every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States ... ,"106 Thus, 
under both documents the states retained powers not delegated to the 
general government. As James Madison noted in The Federalist No. 40, 
"in the new government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; 
and ... the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the enjoyment 
l 04. lt is important to emphasize that rights were not explicitly reserved to the 
people under the original Constitution either, and yet no one thought that the people did 
not have any rights other than those embodied in the original unamended text of the 
Constitution. This construction was made explicit by the Ninth Amendment Id. amend. 
IX. 
JOS. THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976). See also id. NO. 83, at 541 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[A]n affirmative grant 
of special powers would be absurd, as well as useless, if a general authority was 
intended."); 3 DEBATES IN 111E SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 463-64 
(remarks of Edmund Randolph) (stating that Congress' ''powers are enumerated. Is it 
not, then, fairly deducible, that it bas no power but what is expressly given it?-for if 
its powers were to be general, an enumeration would be needless."). 
J06. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art II. It is interesting to note that this 
provision as enacted in the Articles was not originally understood as being necessary. 
The original version provided that "Each Colony shall retain and enjoy as much of its 
present Laws, Rights and Customs as it may think fit, and reserves to itself the sole and 
exclusive Regulation and Government of its internal police, in all matters that shall not 
interfere with the Articles of this Confederation." 5 JOURNALS OF TIIE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 675. Thomas Burke of North Carolina, who proposed 
amendment of the Articles to include this provision, recounted the way in which 1I was 
added as follows: 
[The article] stood originally the third article; and expressed only a reservation 
of the power of regulating internal police, and consequently resigned every 
other power. It appeared to me that this ... left it in the power of the future 
Congress . . . to make their ovm power as unlimited as they please, I 
proposed, therefore, an amendment, which held up the principle, that all 
sovereign Power was in the States separately, and that particular acts of it, 
which should be expressly enumerated, would be exercised in conjunction, and 
not otherwise . . . . This was at first so little understood that it was some time 
before it was seconded . . . . The opposition was made by Mr. Wilson of 
Pennsylvania, and Mr. R.H. Lee of Virginia: in the End however the question 
was carried for my proposition, Eleven ayes, one no, and one divided. . . . I 
was much pleased to find the opinion of accumulating powers to Congress so 
little supported, and I promise myself, in the whole business I shall find my 
ideas relative thereto nearly similar to those of most of the States. 
Letter from Thomas Burke to Richard Caswell (Apr. 29, 1777), in 6 LETTERS OF 
DELEGATES TO CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 671,672 (Paul H. Smith ed., 1976). 
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of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction."107 Perhaps no explicit 
textual provision was necessary in order to convey this aspect of the 
federal structure since both documents represented compacts wherein the 
states delegated only certain enumerated powers and not a general 
legislative power to the general government. 
5. Constitutional Protection for the States as Entities 
A fifth structural similarity between the Constitution and the Articles 
of Confederation is that both documents guaranteed the existence of the 
states as entities. Article II of the Articles provided emphatically that 
"[ e Jach State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence."1' 8 
The fact that the Articles instituted a confederacy "between the states" 
arguably also guaranteed their continued existence. Similar guarantees 
are to be found in the constitutional text. For example, Article V 
precluded amending the Constitution to take away the equality of 
representation of the states in the Senate.109 Similarly, the Guarantee 
Clause of Article IV may be construed to guarantee the continued 
existence of the states as entities possessing "republican" forms of 
government. no Thus, both the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution explicitly ensured that the system established was "an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States."111 
107. THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 255 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). 
108. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. 
I 09. U.S. CONST. art. V (providing that "no State, without its Consent, shall be 
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate"). 
110. Id. art. IV,§ 4. See also infra notes 142-56 and accompanyingtext(discussing 
the role of the Guarantee Clause in the federal sttucture). 
111. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869). The Court's emphasis on 
the constitutional protections guaranteeing the continued existence of the states as entities 
is worth quoting more fully: 
"[T]he people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and 
endowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent 
existence," . .. "[W]ithout the States in Union, there could be no such political 
body as the United States." Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of 
separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their union under the 
Constitution, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of the 
States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the 
design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the 
maintenance of the National government The Constitution, in all its 
provisions, looks to an indesttuctible Union, composed ofindesttuctible States. 
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6. Supremacy 
Finally, a sixth structural similarity between the Articles of Confedera-
tion and the Constitution is that both appear to have established the 
supremacy of the general government over the states within its sphere 
of operation, much like the political union described by Pufendorf. The 
Articles of Confederation made the determinations of Congress binding 
upon the states. Article XIII declared: "Every State shall abide by the 
determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all 
questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the 
Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State 
•••• "
112 Similarly, the Constitution provided: "This Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; 
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of 
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . .. "113 
Thus, one of the most centralizing aspects of the Constitution was also 
present in the federal structure established under the Articles. 
Id. (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869)). See also Grego,y 
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991) (noting that "the States retain substantial 
sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not 
readily interfere''}; Tafllin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (noting that "under our 
federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal 
Government"); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) (stating that 
"neither government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the 
exercise of its powers'1). 
112. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII, para. I. An earlier draft of the 
Articles contained similar language: "Every Colony shall abide by the Determinations 
of the United States assembled, concerning the Services performed and Losses or 
Expences incurred by every Colony for the Common Defence or general Welfare .••• " 
5 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 546-54, art. XII. 
113. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. James Madison defended the Supremacy Clause in 
The Federalist No. 44. Although he did not state that the principle was already 
recognized in the Articles of Confederation, he did not doubt the necessity of the 
principle. He argued that if there were no Supremacy Clause in the Constitution, but 
rather a "saving clause" declaring the supremacy of the state constitutions, 
the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded 
on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have 
seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority 
of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which the head was under the 
direction of the members. 
THE FEDERALisr No. 44, at 296 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). See 
also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheal) 316,403 (1819) (Marshall, 1.) ("If any 
one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind, we might expect it 
would be this-that the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is 
supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result necessarily from its 
nature."). 
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B. Structural Differences 
Although many of the provisions establishing the federal systems 
under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution are similar, 
there are a few notable exceptions. For example, the Constitution added 
a few enumerated powers that were deemed necessary to remedy specific 
problems occurring under the Articles. The Constitution also included 
additional clauses such as the Sweeping Clause and the Guarantee 
Clause. Furthermore, the Constitution included alterations in the 
provisions governing amendment and ratification as well as the 
reservation of powers delegated to the general government. Many of 
these structural differences may be traced to the fundamental difference 
under the Constitution, which was the source of political authority of the 
general government. The political authority of the general government 
under the Constitution was derived from both the states and the people, 
unlike the political authority of the general government under the 
Articles, which was derived from the states alone. 
1. Scope of Enumerated Powers 
As previously noted,114 although many of the enumerated powers 
under the Articles and the Constitution were identical, the general 
government enjoyed greater enumerated powers under the Constitution 
than it had under the Articles of Confederation. Still, the powers 
delegated to the general government remained "few and defined," while 
those of the states remained "numerous and indefinite."115 There was 
114. See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text 
115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 303 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). Madison elaborated: 
If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be 
found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of 
NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL POWERS. 
The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; but that seems to be 
an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are 
entertained. The powers relating to war and peace, arnties and fleets, treaties 
and finance, with the other more considerable powers, are all vested in the 
existing Congress by the Articles of Confederation. The proposed change does 
not enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode of 
administering them. The change relating to taxation may be regarded as the 
most important; and yet the present Congress have as complete authority to 
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merely a slight readjustment in the allocation of powers between the 
general and state governments. As Alexander Hamilton noted, 
The question, then, of the division of powers between the general and state 
governments, is a question of convenience: it becomes a prudential inquiry, 
what powers are proper to be reserved to the latter; and this immediately 
involves another inquiry into the proper objects of the two governments. This 
is the criterion by which we shall detennine the just distribution of powers. 116 
The most important additions to the list of enumerated powers were the 
power to levy taxes117 and the power to regulate interstate and foreign 
commerce.'18 The Articles had proved inadequate since under the 
REQUIRE of the States indefinite supplies of money for the common defence 
and general welfare, as the future Congress will have to require them of 
individual citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the States 
themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on them. 
Id. at 303-04. 
I 16. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 350 
(statement of Alexander Hamilton). James Wilson gave a rule of thumb during the 
ratification debates concerning the proper division of powers: 
Whatever object of government is confined, in its operation and effects, 
within the bounds of a particular state, should be considered as belonging to 
the government of that state; whatever object of government extends, in its 
operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a particular state, should be 
considered as belonging to the government of the United States. 
Id. at 424. Similarly, James Madison concluded that "The powers reserved to the several 
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs; concern the 
lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State." THE FEDERALIST No. 4S, at 303 (James Madison) (Edward 
Mead Earle ed., 1976). As Raoul Berger has noted, the distinction between local and 
national governmental functions was important to the Founding Generation: 
A State's regulation of its schools, hospitals, jails, and the like ordinarily has 
no "effect" beyond its borders, and ... it remains the domain of the State. 
Once, therefore, a particular function is identified as ulocal" as understood by 
the Founders--e.g., "agriculture"--it is protected by the State's "exclusive'' 
jurisdiction of such matters. 
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN, supra note 2, at 7S. 
It is interesting to note that during debates over the drafting of the Articles of 
Confederation, little time was spent on the proper division of powers between the general 
government and the states. See JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 
S7, at 138-39 ("Over ... the distribution of power between the states on the one hand 
and Congress on the other .•• there was only a short discussion ..•• "). Perhaps this 
is due to the fact that there was widespread agreement over the proper province of the 
general government and the state governments. 
117. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and 
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises .... "). 
118. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (delegating the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes"). Prohibitions against 
state activities in Article I, Section IO further strengthened this power. The states were 
prohibited from laying "any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may 
be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws" with the "net Produce of all 
Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports [going to) the Treasury of 
the United States •••. " Id. § 10, cl. 2. Furthennore, a state could not "lay any Duty of 
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Articles it was up to the states to obtain funds to support the general 
government. 119 As Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 
30, 
[T]here must be intenvoven, in the frame of the government, a general power 
of taxation, in one shape or another. 
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; 
as that which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most 
essential functions. A complete power, therefore, to procure a regular and 
adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will J'ermit, may 
be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution.12 
Tonnage." Id. cl. 3. James Madison noted the importance of these provisions in The 
Federalist No. 44: 
The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced 
by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation of 
trade to the federal councils. It is needless, therefore, to remark further on this 
head, than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well 
calculated at once to secure to the States a reasonable discretion in providing 
for the conveniency of their imports and exports, and to the United States a 
reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 292 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
119. For example, Article VIII provided as follows: 
All charges of war and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the 
common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in 
Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall 
be supplied by the several States, in proportion to the value of all land within 
each State, granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the 
buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated according to such mode 
as the United States in Congress assembled, shall from time to time direct and 
appoint 
The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority 
and direction of the Legislatures of the several States, within the time agreed 
upon by the United States in Congress assembled. 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art Vlll. The states were purportedly obliged to follow 
these directives under Article XIII, which stated: "Every State shall abide by the 
detenninations of the United States in Congress assembled, on· all questions which by 
this confederation are submitted to them. And the articles of this confederation shall be 
inviolably observed by every State .... " ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII. 
Alexander Hamilton attacked both the system of quotas for defense as well as 
requisitions for funds in The Federalist No. 22, stating: "The system of quotas and 
requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every view, a system of 
imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and injustice among the members.0 THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 182-83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976). Hamilton reiterated this theme in The Federalist No. 31: 
As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of answering the 
national exigencies must be procured, the power of procuring that article in its 
full extent must necessarily be comprehended in that of providing for those 
exigencies. 
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Thus, a taxing power in the general government was deemed a necessary 
reform. Similarly, provision for a power to regulate interstate and 
foreign commerce was deemed necessary to ensure free movement of 
goods among the several states. 121 As Alexander Hamilton noted 
while attempting to justify a federal commerce power in The Federalist 
No. 22, 
The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States, contrary to the true 
spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and 
complaint to others,.and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not 
restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they 
became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious 
imnediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confedera-
cy. i22 
Thus, the addition of enumerated powers under the Constitution was an 
attempt to remedy certain narrow inadequacies of the general govern-
ment under the Articles of Confederation. It was neither a wholesale 
increase in the powers of the general government nor a grant of a 
general legislative power. The alterations made in this aspect of the 
federal structure were minimal. 
2. The Sweeping Clause 
The Constitution did, however, add one potentially broad enumerated 
power--the power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."123 The so-called 
"Sweeping Clause"124 was the subject of some concern during the 
As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of procuring 
revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in their collective 
capacities, the federal government must of necessity be invested with an 
unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes. 
Id. No. 31, at 190 (Alexander Hamilton). 
121. See PLEASANTS, supra note 29, at 36 (noting that "[!]here were many 
Americans at the time [of ratification of the Constitution] who felt that the absence of 
federal control over commerce was indeed a major problem"). 
122. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 132 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976). See also id. No. 42, at 274 (''The defect of power in the existing 
Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members [has] been clearly 
pointed out by experience."). 
123. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 18. 
124. This terminology was used by Antifederalists and was adopted by the 
Federalists. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 33, at 199-200 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976) (referring to "the sweeping clause, as it has been 
affectedly called"); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal 
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debates over ratification of the Constitution.125 However, the clause 
may be viewed as merely a principle of construction which was made 
textually explicit under the Constitution, much like the Tenth Amend-
ment. As James Madison stated in The Federalist No. 44, 
Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the 
particular powers requisite as means of executing the general powers would 
have resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom is 
more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that wherever the end is 
required, the means are authorized; whenever a general power to do a thing is 
given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included. 126 
Thus, this power of the general govermnent may have implicitly existed 
even under the Articles of Confederation. 
The Federalists noted that the general government had already 
exercised a great degree of power not explicitly provided for in the 
Articles. 127 Under Article II of the Articles of Confederation, the 
Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 270-
71 (1993}. 
125. See 3 DEBATES IN TIIE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 218. 
As the following passage makes clear, the fear was that the clause would legitimate the 
unlimited exercise of power: 
There is a general power given to [the national government] to make all laws 
that will enable them to carry their powers into effect There are no limits 
pointed out They are not restrained or controlled from making any law, 
however oppressive in its operation, which they may think necessary to carry 
their powers into effect. 
Id. See also 3 id. at 436 (remarks of Patrick Hen,y) ("If [members of Congress] think 
any Jaw necessary for their personal safety, after perpetrating the most tyrannical and 
oppressive deeds, cannot they make it by this sweeping clause?"). One commentator 
characterized the danger as follows: 
[f]o make all such Jaws which the Congress shall think necessary and 
proper,-for who shall judge for the legislature what is necessary and 
proper?-Who shall set themselves above the sovereign?-What inferior 
legislature shall set itself above the supreme legislature?-To me it appears 
that no other power on earth can dictate to them or controul them, unless by 
force ...• 
An Old Whig, No. 2 (1787), reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 239 (Philip 
B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 294 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). 
127. See id. No. 38, at 241 (James Madison). According to Madison, "Out of this 
lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent power, which tends to realize all the 
dangers that can be apprehended from a defective construction of the supreme 
government of the Union." Id. Madison listed a number of specific instances of 
congressional exercise of such powers and concluded: "All this has been done; and done 
without the least color of constitutional authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no 
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general government was prohibited from exerc1S1ng any power not 
expressly delegated. In The Federalist No. 44, James Madison argued 
that this was one of three textual alternatives to the Sweeping Clause 
that would serve a similar function. However, the term "expressly" was 
somewhat ambiguous in Madison's opinion. Madison argued both that 
the term "expressly'' could potentially be construed broadly so as to 
impose no restriction on the powers of Congress and that the term 
"expressly'' had in fact been too narrowly construed, enfeebling the 
general govemment.128 Madison also noted that there were certain 
powers that were not "expressly'' delegated, under the narrow construc-
tion of that term, but which were necessary and proper. 129 Thus, the 
"necessary and proper" language may have been merely an attempt to 
make more precise principles that were already present in the Articles of 
Confederation. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that whereas the Articles of Confeder-
ation provided almost no explicit constraints on the exercise of the 
enumerated powers by Congress, the Constitution made explicit many 
constraints on the legislative powers of Congress in Article I, Section 
9.130 Similarly, the first ten amendments, which were contemplated at 
alann has been sounded." Id. 
128. According to Madison, 
Had the convention taken the first method of adopting the second article of 
Confederation, it is evident that the new Congress would be continually 
exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the 
tenn "expressly'' with so much rigor, as to disann the government of all real 
authority whatever, or with so much latitude as to destroy altogether the force 
of the restriction. 
Id. No. 44, at 293 (James Madison). 
129. Madison stated: 
It would be easy to show, if it were necessary, that no important power, 
delegated by the articles of Confederation, has been or can be executed by 
Congress, without recurring more or less to the doctrine of cons/ruction or 
implication. As the powers delegated under the new system are more 
extensive, the government which is to administer it would find itself still more 
distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing 
nothing, or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers indispensably 
necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not expressly granted. 
Id. Thus, Madison once again noted the broad scope of the powers exercised by 
Congress under the Articles of Confederation-powers that were not explicitly 
recognized in the text 
130. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 9, cl. 2 (guaranteeing the privilege of the writ of habeas 
corpus); id. cl. 3 (prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws); id. cl. 4 
(prohibiting capitation and other direct taxes); id. cl. 5 (prohibiting taxes on articles 
exported from any state); id. cl. 6 (prohibiting preferences to individual states given by 
regulations of commerce); id. cl. 7 (requiring appropriations made by law prior to the 
withdrawal of money from the treasury); id. cl. 8 (prohibiting the granting of titles of 
nobility). The prohibition against direct taxation was in effect repealed with ratification 
of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, authorizing the income tax. See id. amend. XVI, 
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the time of ratification of the original Constitution, spell out additional 
constraints on the powers of the general government. Finally, the 
Sweeping Clause authorized only those laws that were both "necessary 
and proper"-perhaps indicating a further constraint on congressional 
lawmaking authority.131 Thus, in explicitly granting the power to 
make all laws that were necessary and proper, the Constitution may 
merely have been evidencing the tendency of the Framers to more 
explicitly state the scope of the enumerated powers. The Sweeping 
Clause stands in contrast to the list of limitations on the exercise of 
congressional powers in Article I, Section 9, but both illustrate the 
greater specificity of the Constitution. 
3. Source of Political Authority 
Although the enumerated powers of the general government were 
slightly enlarged under the Constitution, the most significant alteration 
in the federal structure is the source of the political authority of the 
general government. Under the Articles, this authority was derived 
completely from the state governments as entities.132 There was a 
131. See Lawson & Granger, supra note 124, at 273-74 (arguing that the tenn 
"proper'' places some restrictions on the exercise of the enumerated powers by the 
general government and concluding that "a 'proper' executory law must be peculiarly 
and distinctively within the province of the national and therefore must respect the 
national government's jurisdictional boundaries"). The Framers probably contemplated 
executive and judicial review of legislative detenninations of what was necessary and 
proper. As James Madison noted in The Federalist No. 44: 
If it be asked what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall 
misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers not warranted 
by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or 
enlarge any other power vested in them . . . . In the first instance, the success 
of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, 
which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last 
resort a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can, by the election 
of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 294-95 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
See also 2 DEBATES lN TIIE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 362 
(statement of Alexander Hamilton) ("[I]he laws of Congress are restricted to a certain 
sphere, and when they depart from this sphere, they are no longer supreme or binding."). 
132. See HOFFERT, supra note 2J at 39-40. Modern commentators have noted the 
importance of the states in the constitutional structure of the Articles: 
The Articles does not center its attention on autonomous individuals. This is 
not to suggest that it does not care about liberty. On the contrary, the Articles 
specifically mentions the securing of liberties as one of the primary purposes 
of the confederated league. The liberty it wishes to secure, however, is that 
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complete equality among the states in terms of the political authority that 
they could exercise.133 The title of the Articles underscored the fact 
that it was perceived to be a compact among the states as entities. 
Furthermore, under the Articles the delegates to Congress were 
appointed "in such manner as the legislature of each State shall direct" 
and not directly by the people. 134 
In contrast, under the Constitution, the political authority of the 
general government is arguably derived both from the state governments 
as entities as well as from the people of the several states. Thus, the 
Constitution represents a partial consolidation as compared with the 
Articles of Confederation. Evidence of this fact may be found within 
the constitutional text. For example, under the Constitution, Senators 
were originally appointed by the state legislatures,135 whereas members 
of the House of Representatives were to be elected directly by the 
"People of the several States."136 This differed from the Articles of 
Confederation where members of Congress were appointed by the state 
legislatures and there was no direct election of representatives. 
Furthermore, the electoral college provided a mechanism under which 
the states appointed "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct"137 electors who would then vote for the President and Vice 
President.138 Therefore, the states exercised their political authority as 
entities in determining representatives in both the legislative and 
executive departments. Similarly, under Article V of the Constitution, 
the state legislatures as well as the people themselves bad a role to play 
in amending the Constitution, iodicating that both the state governments 
of the states-or, more precisely, that of the primary communities, which are 
the states. 
Id. The question of where to vest most of the power under the Articles was anolher 
issue implicating questions of political authority. See JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION, supra note 57, at 161 ("The fundamental issue in the writing of the 
Articles of Confederation was the location of ultimate political authority, the problem 
of sovereignty. Should it reside in Congress or in the states?"). 
133. In fact, in an early draft of the Articles, this equality was underscored in a 
separate article. Article XVII provided that "[i]n detennining Questions each Colony 
shall have one Vote." 5 JOURNALS OF TilE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 59, at 
546-54. 
134. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art V. Further enhancing delegates' 
dependence on the state legislatures was the fact that under the Articles there was "a 
power reserved to each State to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any time within 
the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year." Id. 
135. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. I. 
136. Id. art I, § 2, cl. I. 
137. Id. art. II, § I, cl. 2. The Twelfth Amendment changed this process slightly. 
See id. amend. XII. 
138. Id. art II, § I, cl. 3. 
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and the people directly were the source of political authority for the 
general government. 139 
The real innovation under the Constitution was that the general 
government depended at all for its authority on the people. The 
Constitution, unlike the Articles of Confederation, could no longer be 
viewed as merely a treaty among sovereign state govermnents, but rather 
established a system under which the general government was directly 
accountable to the people. It represented a real change from the political 
unions described by Vattel and Pufendorf. This was a source of 
potential danger with which Antifederalists were concerned. Since the 
general government depended for its political authority, at least in part, 
on the whole people of the United States, through amendment of the 
Constitution, the whole people could progressively erode the province of 
the individual states, while enlarging that of the general government.140 
In fact, Antifederalist concerns were realized, to a certain extent, when 
the Constitution was amended to provide for direct election of Senators 
by the people under the Seventeenth Amendment.141 
139. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text 
140. As one Antifederalist noted, 
It is beyond a doubt that the new federal constitution, if adopted, will in a 
great measure destroy, if it do not totally annihilate, the separate governments 
of the several states. We shall, in effect, become one great Republic .•.. 
From the moment we become one great Republic, either in form or substance, 
the period is very shortly removed, when we shall sink first into monarchy, 
and then into despotism. 
3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 31-32. See also infra notes 214-
19 and accompanying text 
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. I ("The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years 
.... "). In a dissenting opinion in Garcia, Justice O'Connor observed the importance 
of this structural change: 
(R]ecent changes in the workings of Congress, such as the direct election of 
Senators and the expanded influence of national interest groups ... may well 
have lessened the weight Congress gives to the legitimate interests of States 
as States. As a result, there is now a real risk that Congress will gradually 
erase the diffusion of power between State and Nation on which the Framers 
based their faith in the efficiency and vitality of our Republic. 
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584 (1984) (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting) ( citation omitted). 
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4. The Guarantee Clause 
A further innovation in the text of the Constitution was the Guarantee 
Clause. This was an addition to Article Iv, which had been substantially 
copied from the Articles to the Constitution. 142 The fourth section of 
Article IV of the Constitution provides as follows: 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican 
Fonn of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on 
Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot 
be convened) against domestic Violence. 143 
It is noteworthy that this provision is placed in that article of the 
Constitution that governs the relations among the states. Other 
provisions in Article IV such as the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
and the Full Faith and Credit Clause establish the reciprocal relations 
among the states. However, this provision seems to guarantee both the 
continued existence of the states as well as the continued existence of 
states of a certain sort--those having "republican" forms of government. 
Thus, the clause guarantees the maintenance of a federal system of a 
certain sort, as well as the stability of the federal system. 144 As James 
Madison noted in The Federalist No. 43, 
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of 
republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess 
authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. 
The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have 
the members in the political institutions of each other; and the greater right to 
insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into 
should be substantially maintained.14s 
Madison justified this provision as a useful guarantee, querying "who 
can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular 
142. See supra notes 69-88 and accompanying text. 
143. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
144. A number of commentators have recently addressed the potential role of the 
Guarantee Clause in maintaining the federal system. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., On 
Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 469 (1984); Deborah Jones 
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism/or a Third Century, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. I (1988). 
The fact that the Supreme Court bas interpreted the clause to raise nonjusticiable 
political questions has effectively emasculated this valuable provision maintaining the 
integrity of the federal system. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 
118 (1912). 
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 282 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). Madison continued by quoting Montesquieu's discussion of the confederate 
republics of Gennany and ancient Greece as examples of confederate systems that 
experienced difficulties as a result of members' having varying fonns of government. 
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States, by the ambition of ente_;Prising leaders, or by the intrigues and 
influence of foreign powers?"' Thus, the addition of the Guarantee 
Clause was necessitated by the closer union among the states established 
under the Constitution. 
However, the question of what constitutes a "republican" form of 
government has never been well settled. 147 James Madison attempted 
to give a definition of a "republic" in The Federalist No. 39, while 
trying to demonstrate that the Constitution did indeed establish a general 
government that was republican in form. Madison's definition is not 
particularly precise: 
If we resort for a criterion, to the different principles on which different 
forms of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least 
may bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly 
or indirectly from the great body of the people; and is administered by persons 
holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good 
behavior. t4s 
146. Id. at 282-83. 
147. For example, John Adams stated that he "never understood" what the 
Guarantee Clause meant and "believe[d] no man ever did or ever will." WILLIAM M. 
WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 72 (1972) (quoting 
Letter from John Adams to Mercy Warren (July 20, 1807)). In The Federalist No. 43, 
James Madison stated that "the forms of government under which the compact was 
entered should be substantially maintained" and that a republican form of government 
"supposes a preexisting government of the fonn which is to be guaranteed." As a result, 
the states were forbidden to "exchange republican for anti.republican Constitutions." 
THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 282-83 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
For a discussion of the history of the clause, see WIECEK, supra; Arthur E. Bonfield, The 
Guarantee Clause of Article IV. Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 
MINN. L. REV. 513, 565-69 (1962); Merritt, supra note 144 (arguing that the Guarantee 
Clause implies a modest restraint on federal power to interfere with state autonomy); 
Thomas A. Smith, Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the 
Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561 (1984) (arguing that the clause embodies rule of 
law values). 
148. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at243-44 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). Madison noted that there had been "extreme inaccuracyn in the ways in which 
the term "republican" had been used to designate different governments. Madison 
observed: 
What then are the distinctive characters of the republican fonn? Were an 
answer to this question to be sought. not by recurring to principles, but in the 
application of the tenn by political writers, to the constitutions of different 
States, no satisfactory one would ever be found. 
Id. at 243. Madison argued that Holland, Venice, Poland, and England had been 
inaccurately characterized as ''republics~• when, in fact, the governments of these 
countries had monarchical and aristocratic aspects. The approach Madison took in 
arguing that the general government was republican was somewhat complex. Madison 
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Thus, republics, at a minimum, derived their political authority from the 
people and not from a subset of the people or a single individual. 149 
In The Federalist No. 43, Madison noted that the current state govern-
ments were republican in nature. 150 Thus, some evidence of what 
constituted a "republican" form of government may be derived from 
examining the state constitutions of this period. Furthermore, Madison 
followed the textual distinction between the guarantee of a republican 
observed: 
In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered 
in relation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources 
ftom which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those 
powers; to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future changes in 
the government are to be introduced. 
Id. at 246. Thus, Madison analyzed procedures for ratification, the structure of the 
legislature and limits on its power, and provisions for amendment of the Constitution. 
149. Samuel Johnson's 1786 dictionary defined "Republican" as "Placing the 
government in the people." Merritt, supra note 144, at 24 n.130. James Madison wrote 
that a republic is "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from 
the great body of the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243 (James Madison) 
(Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). See also id. No. 10, at 59 (James Madison) (stating 
that a republic is characterized by "the delegation of the Government ... to a small 
number of citizens elected by the rest''); id. No. 37, at 227 (James Madison) ("The 
genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side, not only that all power should 
be derived from the people, but that those intrusted with it should be kept in dependence 
on the people ... .''). Similarly, Alexander Hamilton stated that "the fundamental 
maxim of republican government ... requires that the sense of the majority should 
prevail.'' Id. No. 22, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton). See also id. No. 57, at 370 (James 
Madison or Alexander Hamilton) ("The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the 
characteristic policy of republican government''). Charles Pinckney stated that a 
republic was a form of government in which ''the people at large, either collectively or 
by representation, form the legislature.'' 4 DEBATES IN TIIE SEVERAL STATE CONVEN· 
TIONS, supra note 47, at 328. Finally, James Wilson stated that republican governments 
were based on the "principle□ that the Supreme Power resides in the body of the 
people.'' Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793). See also 1 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSITrUTION OFTIIE UNITED STATES 146-47 (Thomas 
M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. 1873) ("Strictly speaking, in our republican forms of government 
the absolute sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation; and the residuary 
sovereignty of each State, not granted to any of its public functionaries, is in the people 
of the State."). Modem commentators have also recognized the central importance of 
the notion of popular sovereignty. For example, Akhil Amar has called this the "central 
pillar of Republican Government." Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of 
Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator 
Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749 (1994). 
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 282 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). However, Madison also noted that 
Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they 
have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The 
only restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican 
for anti-republican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will 
hardly be considered as a grievance. 
Id. at 283. 
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form of government and the "protection against invasion"151 and 
"protection against domestic violence."152 Based on Madison's 
definition of a "republican form" of government and the placement of 
the Guarantee Clause next to these other clauses in Article IV, the 
purpose of the Guarantee Clause was probably to ensure that the political 
authority of each state government was derived from the people of the 
state. Neither foreign invaders, nor internal usurpers, nor even the 
people of the whole United States153 were to serve as the source of 
political authority in any of the states. Rather, the governments of the 
states had to derive their powers directly from the people of the 
state. 154 Thus, the Guarantee Clause ensured the continued existence 
l S 1. According to Madison, uA protection against invasion is due from every 
society to the parts composing it The latitude of the expression here used seems to 
secure each State, not only against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive 
enterprises of its more powerful neighbors." Id. 
152. Madison noted that such guarantees were hardly novel and cited a contempo-
rary example: 
It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly 
speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and 
the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and 
afforded; and as well by the most democratic, as the other cantons. A recent 
and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for 
emergencies of a like nature. 
Id. (referring, most likely, to Shays' Rebellion). A further concern of this provision was 
the potential of a slave revolt Madison noted that either alien residents or slaves might 
side with a minority faction and work innovations in the structure of government that 
would be anti-republican: 
May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of cmzENS may become a 
majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse 
of adventurers, or of those whom the constitution of the State has not admitted 
to the rights of suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population 
abounding in some of the States, who, during the cahn of regular government, 
are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil 
violence, may emerge into the human character, and give a superiority of 
strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. 
Id. at 284-85. 
153. It is noteworthy, for example, that Madison recognized the danger to the 
sovereignty of the states from powerful neighbors in discussing the clauses in this article. 
See supra notes 145.52 and accompanying text If neighboring states could serve as a 
source of danger, so too could the national government, singling out certain states. 
Thus, the Guarantee Clause is consistent with the structural provisions found in the 
Constirution guaranteeing the continued existence of the states as entities. See supra 
notes 108-11 and accompanying text 
154. A corollary of this guarantee might have been that certain rights were 
presumed to have been retained by the people. As Justice Story speculated in his 
Commentaries: 
297 
of the states as entities as long as the people of the state consented to the 
existence of their state government. 1bis guarantee was particularly 
important since the whole people of the United States could conceivably 
amend the Constitution to the detriment of a single state or group of 
states. 
It is unclear whether a comparable provision is found in the Articles 
of Confederation. One provision that may have served the same purpose 
as the Guarantee Clause is the guarantee of the preservation of state 
sovereignty found in Article II. The guarantee of state sovereignty may 
have been construed to also guarantee governments that were republican 
in form. 155 However, the guarantee seems to have represented merely 
a prohibition against action by the general government, and not a 
guarantee of a republican form of government in the face of internal 
usurpations. With conflicts such as Shays' Rebellion156 in Massachu-
Whether, indeed, independently of the Constitution of the United States, the 
nature of republican and free governments does not necessarily impose some 
restraints upon the legislative power, has been much discussed. It seems to be 
the general opinion, fortified by a strong current of judicial opinion, that, since 
the American revolution, no state government can be presumed to possess the 
transcendental sovereignty to take away vested rights of property; to take the 
property of A and transfer to B by a mere legislative act That government 
can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property are left solely 
dependent upon a legislative body, without any restraint The fundamental 
maxims of a free government seem to require, that the rights of personal 
liberty and private property should be held sacred. At least, no court of justice 
in this country would be warranted in assuming, that any State legislature 
possessed a power to violate and disregard them; or that such a power, so 
repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil liberty, lurked under 
any general grant of legislative authority, or ought to be implied from any 
general expression of the will of the people, in the usual forms of the 
constitutional delegation of power. The people ought not to be presumed to 
part with rights so vital to their security and well-being, without very strong 
and positive declarations to that effect 
2 STORY, supra note 149, at 261-62. 
155. It is interesting to note that in an earlier draft of the Articles of Confederation 
there was a provision guaraoteeing the police power of the states. Article Ill read as 
follows: "Each Colony shall retain and enjoy as much of its present Laws, Rights and 
Customs, as it may think fit, and reserves to itself the sole and exclusive Regulation and 
Government of its internal police, in aII matters that shaII not interfere with the Articles 
of this Confederation." 5 JOURNALS OF nm CONTINENTAL CoNGRESS, SUJ?ra note 59, 
at 546-54, art. III. John Dickinson made the following notation next to this provision: 
"Quaere. The Propriety of the Union's guaranteeing to every colony their respective 
Constitution and form of Government" Id. This notation may indicate that although 
the provisions of Article III were related to a guarantee of a republican form of 
government to the states, they were not identical and that Dickinson contemplated the 
addition of a Guarantee Clause in the Articles. 
156. For a discussion of Shays' Rebellion of 1786 and its influence on the Founding 
Generation, see FARRAND, supra note 29, at 95 ("Shays' Rebellion was fairly easily 
suppressed, even though it required the shedding of some blood. But it was the 
possibility of further outbreaks that destroyed men's peace of mind."); PLEASANTS, supra 
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setts threatening to result in internal usurpations of state government 
power, additional guarantees were probably thought to be necessary. 
5. Amendment 
Amendment under tbe Articles of Confederation was extremely 
difficult. The union was to be "perpetual," and yet tbe Articles provided 
that no alteration to tbe Articles could be made "at any time hereafter 
... unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of tbe United 
States, and be afterwards confirmed by tbe Legislatures of every 
State."157 Thus, unlike Article V of the Constitution, the amendment 
process depended on tbe unanimous consent of tbe state legislatures and 
did not involve the people directly. This is further evidence that the 
union under the Articles was a compact among the states as entities and 
did not involve the people directly. 
In contrast, under Article V of the Constitution, amendments had to 
be "ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or 
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of 
Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . .. " 158 In fact, a 
requirement for unanimous consent "by the several States" was explicitly 
rejected by the Convention. 159 This supermajority requirement and the 
note 29, at 34-35. 
157. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII, para. I. 
158. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
159. Roger Shennan of Connecticut bad made a motion to add a unanimity 
requirement to Article V. 2 RECORDS OF TIIE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 
558. However, James Wilson intervened, first moving for a two-thirds requirement, 
which failed 5-6. Id. at 558-59. He then moved to insert the three-fourths requirement, 
and the motion passed unanimously. Id. at 559. There was no thought of a simple 
majority requirement for ratification of amendments. This is consistent with the notion 
that the states were also parties to the compact forming the federal wiion. See infra 
notes 235-39 and accompanying text. 
The unanimous consent requirement of the Articles was widely criticized. See, e.g., 
2 RECORDS OF Tiffi FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 558 (remarks of Alexander 
Hamilton) ("It had been wished by many and was much to have been desired that an 
easier mode for introducing amendments had been provided by the articles of Confedera-
tion."); Charles Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government Submitted to the 
Federal Convention, reprinted in 3 id. at 120 (noting the necessity of"destroy[ing] that 
unanimity which upon ... the present System bas unfortunately made necessary ... it 
is to this nnanimous consent, the depressed situation of the Union is undoubtedly 
owing"); 3 DEBATES IN Tiffi SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 89 
(remarks of James Madison in the Virginia ratification debate) (''The inconveniences 
resulting from this requisition~ of unanimous concurrence in alterations in the 
299 
potential for ratification by constitutional conventions160 indicates that 
the people were to have a more direct role in amendment and, therefore, 
that the Constitution was a compact of both the people and the states as 
entities. The fact that the requirement was measured in tenns of the 
states as entities indicates that the Constitution was a compact of the 
states as well as the people. These points were noted by James Madison 
in The Federalist No. 39.161 Madison recognized that the structure of 
Article V indicated that the Constitution was based on a compact among 
the states as entities as well as the people-a partial consolidatioll-l,ince 
in effect it mandated consent of a majority of the people as well as a 
majority of the states for ratification of any amendments. 
The danger of this fonn of government, as far as the Antifederalists 
were concerned, was that the people could in effect eradicate the power 
of the states without their consent through amendment.162 For exam-
ple, during the Philadelphia Convention Roger Shennan "expressed his 
fears that three fourths of the States might be brought to do things fatal 
to particular States, as abolishing them altogether or depriving them of 
their equality in the Senate" and moved that "no State should be affected 
in its internal police, or deprived of its equality in the Senate."163 The 
exception for equal suffrage of the states remained in the final version 
of the Constitution164 as a prophylactic against the people's undermin-
ing the fundamental nature of the compact forming the union as one 
among both the people and the states. It is significant that no such 
exception is found in the Articles. There was no need for such a 
provision in the Articles, since it was merely a compact among the states 
as entities. 
Confederation, must be lmown to every member in this Convention.n). 
I 60. For a discussion of such conventions, see Amar, supra note 2, at 1459-60. 
161. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 249-SO (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). See also infra note 235 and accompanying text; Monaghan, supra note 2, at 138 
("To my eyes, neither completely state-centered nor completely nationalist views of the 
founding capture the original understanding. I believe that Madison got the dominant 
understanding right."). 
162. See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text, discussing Antifederalist 
concerns that the Constitution created a "consolidation" of the states. 
163. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 629. 
164. U.S. CONST. art. V. After Shennan's motion failed 3-8, Shennan moved to 
strike Article V completely. Gouverneur Morris then moved to include the equal 
suffrage exception alone, and this motion was "agreed to without debate." 2 RECORDS 
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 630-31. 
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6. Ratification 
The Articles of Confederation were ratified by the state legisla-
tures-not by the people directly. 165 In contrast, the Constitution was 
to be ratified by conventions of nine states. 166 There are two important 
observations that may be made concerning the ratification mechanism 
under the Constitution. First, the people were to be directly involved in 
ratification, indicating that they were parties to the compact established 
under the Constitution. Second, the fact that it was to be ratified by a 
supermajority of the states further indicates that the people were parties 
to the compact. If only the states as entities were parties to the compact 
then a majority of the states would be sufficient for ratification. 
However, if the people themselves were also parties to the compact then 
a majority of the people would also be necessary--ratification by a 
supermajority of the state conventions would be a close approximation 
to ratification by a majority of the whole people.167 
7. Residual Powers Retained by the People as Well as the States 
Finally, further textual support for the argument that the Articles of 
Confederation was a compact among the states as entities, while the 
Constitution was a compact to which individuals also were directly 
parties, is to be found in the Tenth Amendment. Under that amendment, 
powers were reserved to both the states and the people. 168 In contrast, 
Id. 
165. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII, para. 2. 
And Whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the World to incline the 
hearts of the legislatures we respectively represent in congress, to approve of, 
and to authorize us to ratify the said articles of confederation and perpetual 
union. Know Ye that we the undersigned delegates, by virtue of power and 
authority to us given for that purpose, do by these presents, in the name and 
in behalf of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm 
each and every of the said articles of confederation and perpetual union, and 
all and singular the matters and things therein contained. 
166. U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
167. See infra notes 240-44 and accompanying text, further discussing the 
supennajority requirement of Article VII. 
168. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also id. amend. IX (providing that "[t]he 
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people."); THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 249 (James 
Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976) (noting that under the Constitution the 
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under Article II of the Articles of Confederation, powers were reserved 
only to the states. 169 This indicates that under the Articles of Confed-
eration, the states as entities delegated powers, whereas under the 
Constitution, both the people and the states delegated powers to the 
general government. 
IY. SOCIAL COMPACT THEORY AND THE POLITICAL AUTHORITY 
UNDERLYING THE GENERAL GoVERNMENT 
From the foregoing textual analysis of the Constitution and the 
Articles of Confederation, it is clear that there are clues within the 
structural provisions of these documents indicating the nature of the 
federal systems established under each. Basic structural elements found 
in the Articles remained unchanged in the Constitution. The provisions 
governing reciprocity among the states, delegation of enumerated powers 
to the general government, and constitutional guarantees of the continued 
existence of the states as entities---of the continued existence of a 
compound republic-are similar. However, there is a fundamental 
difference between the systems established under the two documents. 
The Articles were based on a compact among the states as entities. 170 
The Constitution was based on a compact among the people as well as 
the states. In order to better understand the nature of this distinction, 
this Part examines the political theory of society as being based on a 
compact, which served as the intellectual background of these systems. 
A. Background: Constitutions as Compacts 
The model of society as being based on a social compact was well-
ingrained in the political thought of the Founding Generation.171 
Society was often conceptualized as being based upon the consent of 
individuals existing in a state of nature. For example, Justice Story 
jurisdiction of the general government would extend to "certain enumerated objects only, 
... leav[ing] to the several States a residua,y and inviolable sovereignty over all other 
objects"); id. ("[L]ocal or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions 
of the supremacy, no more subJect, within their respective spheres, to the general 
authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere."); Lane 
County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869) (noting that the Constitution 
recognized "the necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper spheres, the 
independent authority of the States"). 
169. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. 
170. See Ackerman & Katya!, supra note 23, at 551 ("The Articles were often 
described as a 'compact'-usually modified with adjectives like 'solemn' or 
'fundamental' to indicate its very special status."). 
171. See FARRAND, supra note 29, at 38-43 (discussing the influence of social 
compact theories on the Founding Generation). 
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stated in his Commentaries that it was commonly thought that "civil 
society . . . depend[ s] upon a social compact of the people composing 
the nation."172 Under these social compact theories, citizens were 
described variously as "members of a civil society"173 or a "body 
politic."174 Members of the Founding Generation were familiar with 
the works of political writers such as Burlamaqui, 175 Locke, 176 
Pufendorf, In and Vattel, 178 who conceptualized society as being 
172. 2 STORY, supra note 149, at 225. 
173. VATTEL, supra note 36, at 87. 
174. 2 STORY, supra note 149, at 145. 
175. See JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND Potmc 
LAW 120 (Nugent trans., 4th ed. 1792). Burlamaqui described the fonnation of societies 
as follows: 
All societies ase fonned by the concurrence or union of the wills of several 
persons, with a view of acquiring some advantage. Hence it is that societies 
are considered as bodies, and receive the appellation of moral persons; by 
reason that those bodies are in effect animated with one sole will, which 
regulates all their movements. This agrees particulasly with the body politic 
or state. 
Id. See also id. at 119 ("Among the various establishments of man, the most 
considerable without doubt is that of civil society, or the body politic, which is justly 
esteemed the most perfect of societies, and has obtained the nasne of State by way of 
preference."). 
176. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 56 (Prometheus 
Books 1986) (1690) ("When any number of men have so consented to make one 
community or goverrunent, they ase thereby presently incorporated, and make one body 
politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest"); id. at 76 (noting 
that in order to "avoid [the] inconveniencies which disorder men's properties in the state 
of Nature, men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the whole 
society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it 
by which every one may know what is his"). 
177. See 2 PUFENDORF, supra note 45, at 454. Pufendorf described his conception 
of society based on a compact in the folJowing passage: 
For a multitude, or many men, to become one person, to whom one action can 
be attributed and certain rights belong. in so far as this one person is distinct 
from individuals, and the rights be such as the individuals cannot attribute to 
themselves, it is necessasy for them to have united their wills and strength by 
intervening pacts, without which a union of several persons equal by nature is 
impossible of comprehension. 
Id. at 973-74. In another work, Pufendorf gave a related view of societal pacts: 
There are ... two pacts which combine in the establishment of society, and 
primarily of a civil society. One is the pact of individuals with individuals, 
to the effect that they desire to have their affairs which are mutually 
intertwined, administered by common counsel; the other is the one which is 
made with those to whom the care of the common safety is entrusted. 
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LmRI Duo 
(ELEMENTS OF UNIVERSAL JURISPRUDENCE) I 02 (Jasnes Brown Scott ed., Williasn Abbot 
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based on a compact among citizens. Justice Story noted the importance 
of the theory of society as being based upon a compact, stating: "The 
doctrine maintained by many eminent writers upon public law in modem 
times is, that civil society has its foundation in a voluntary consent or 
submission; and, therefore, it is often said to depend upon a social 
compact of the people composing the nation."179 Justice Story referred 
to this as a "visionary'' idea that was present also in the work of 
Blackstone, who described the social compact as forming the basis of a 
"union" necessitated by the "weakness and imperfection" of man-
kind.1,0 
Justice Story defined the term "state" as "a body politic, or society of 
men, united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety 
and advantage by their combined strength."181 The state represented 
the union of the people through compact into one entity. According to 
Story, consistent with these theories, the state governments in the United 
States were based upon compacts among the members of each of the 
states.182 Although Story contended that constitutions themselves were 
not compacts, but rather fundamental laws, which were binding upon the 
states and people unlike mere contracts that could be breached, he noted 
that the idea that constitutions themselves were compacts was wide-
spread. For example, he quoted Chief Justice Jay for the proposition 
that the United States Constitution as well as the state constitutions were 
"compacts" among the people based upon their consent.183 
trans., Clarendon Press 1931) (1672). 
178. See VATIEL, supra note 36. 
179. 1 STORY, supra note 149, at 225 (footnotes omitted). 
180. Blackstone, as quoted by Justice Story, slated that the nature of the "original 
contract of society" was that: 
the whole should protect all its parts, and that every part should pay obedience 
to the will of the whole; or, in other words, that the community should guard 
the rights of each individual member; and that in return for this. protection 
each individual should submit to the laws of the community. 
Id. at 227-28. 
181. Id. at 145 (citing EMMERJCH DE VATIEL, LAW OF NATIONS and Chisholm v. 
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,455 (1793) (Wilson, J.)). 
182. Justice Story quo Jed lhe preamble of the constitution of Massachusetts, which 
slated that "'the body politic is formed by a volunJary association of individuals; that it 
is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each 
citizen with lhe whole people, !hat all shall be governed by certain laws for the common 
good."' Id. at 227. 
I 83. Id. Justice Story quoted Chief Justice Jay as slating !hat: 
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State to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution of the 
United States is, likewise, a compact made by the people of lhe United States, 
to govern themselves as to general objects in a certain manner/' 
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Story's insistence that constitutions themselves were not merely 
compacts, but rather fundamental laws, was in some sense merely a 
matter of semantics. A noted nationalist, he wished to emphasize the 
binding nature of constitutions as supreme law.184 In this, he was in 
accord with Alexander Hamilton, who, in The Federalist No. 78 stated: 
"A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a 
fundamental law."185 Similarly, Emmerich de Vattel stated in his Law 
of Nations: 
The fundamental law which deternrines the manner in which the public 
authority is to be exercised is what forms the constitution of the State. In it can 
be seen the organization by means of which the Nation acts as a political body; 
how and by whom the people are to be governed, and what are the rights and 
duties of those who govern. 186 
Thus, even among those theorists who recognized society as being based 
on a compact, the terminology of "fundamental law'' was used to 
describe the document establishing the government. 
184. Story made his motivation in making the distinction between compacts and 
fundamental laws clear in the following passage: 
A constitution is in fact a fundamental law or basis of government, and falls 
strictly within the definition of law as given by Mr. Justice Blackstone. It is 
a rule of action prescribed bY the supreme power in a state, regulating the 
rights and duties of the whole community. It is a rule, as contradistinguished 
from a temporaiy or sudden order; pennanent, unifonn, and universal. It is 
also called a rule, to distinguish it from a compact or agreement; for a compact 
(be adds) is a promise proceeding from us, law is a command directed to us. 
The language of a compact is, I will or will not do this; that of a law is, Thou 
shalt or shalt not do it "In compacts we ourselves determine and promise 
what shall be done before we are obliged to do it In laws we are obliged to 
act without ourselves determining or promising anything at all." It is a rule 
prescribed; that is, it is laid down, promulgated, and established. It is 
prescribed by the supreme power in a state, that is, among us, by the people, 
or a majority of them in their original sovereign capacity. 
Id. at 236 (second emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
185. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 506 {Alexander Hamilton) {Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976). As James Wilson noted at the Pennsylvania ratifying convention: 
This ... is not a government founded upon compact; it is founded upon the 
power of the people. They express in their name and their authority-"We, 
the people, do ordain and establish," &c; 
[11he system itself tells you what it is; it is an ordinance and establishment of 
the people. 
2 DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 497-99. 
186. VATTEL, supra note 36. at 17. 
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Justice Story argued that the social compact upon which the federal 
government was founded existed, in a sense, prior to ratification of the 
Constitution. However, Story himself admitted that the view that the 
Constitution itself was a social compact and was not preceded by the 
actual social compact had been expressed by some individuals, among 
them Chief Justice Jay187 and Tucker in his edition of Blackstone's 
Commentaries on the Laws of England. 188 Justice Story endorsed this 
position in part. However, he argued that the social compact forming 
the union of the people in the United States was embodied in the 
Declaration of Independence and that it existed before the Constitution 
was ratified. According to him, the Constitution "is . . • to a certain 
extent, a social compact . . . . But a contract of this nature actually 
existed in a visible form between the citizens of each State in their 
several constitutions."189 In arguing that the political community and 
social compact existed prior to ratification of the Constitution, Justice 
Story's concern was that states' rights advocates might use the theory of 
the Constitution as a compact based on consent to erode the powers of 
the general government. 190 According to Justice Story, when the 
187. Justice Story quoted Chief Justice Jay's remarks in Chisholm v. Georgia, 
stating that: 
"every State constitution is a compact, made by and between the citizens of 
the State to gov em themselves in a certain manner; and the Constitution of the 
United States is likewise a compact, made by the people of the United States 
to govern themselves, as to general objects, in a certain manner." The context 
abundantly shows that he considered it a fundamental law of government, and 
that its powers did not rest on mere treaty, but were supreme and were to be 
construed by the judicial departmen~ and that the States were bound to obey. 
I STORY, supra note 149, at 243 n.l (emphasis added). 
188. Id. at 215. Justice Story stated that Tucker believed that 
[T]he Constitution of the United States is an original, written, federal, and 
social compact, freely, voluntarily, and solemnly entered into by the several 
States, and ratified by the people thereof, respectively; whereby the several 
States and the people thereofrespectively have bound themselves to each other 
and to the Federal government of the United States, and by which the Federal 
government is bound to the several States and to every citizen of the United 
States. 
Id. (citing I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON 1HE LAWS OF ENGLAND 140 
app. note D (St George Tucker ed.)). According to Story, Tucker distinguished the 
constitutional compact from a charter or grant because the Constitution was founded by 
equals "whether considered as States in their poJitical capacity and character, or as 
individuals .... " Id. 
189. Id. at 217. 
190. Justice Story's concerns are evidenced in bis remarks on the statements made 
by Chief Justice Jay. See supra notes 183, 187. Justice Story argued that theories of 
the Constitution as a compact "seem mainly urged with a view to draw conclusions 
which are at war with the known powers and reasonable objects of the Constitution; and 
which, if successful, would reduce the government to a mere confederation." I STORY, 
supra note 149, at 260. Story argued that these views were "not justified by the 
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Constitution is called a "compact," it means that "it is a voluntary and 
solemn consent of the people to adopt it, as a form of government . 
• • • "
191 Therefore, he recognized the establishment of government as 
being based upon consent, but declined to describe such an establishment 
as a "compact" among the states alone in order to preclude the 
possibility that the states as entities could alone decide to breach the 
contract among themselves. 
Whether or not Story's distinction between fundamental laws and 
compacts was widely held by the Founding Generation, the fact remains 
that constitutions were viewed as being based upon the consent of the 
parties to the compact. Whether the compact itself existed prior to 
ratification of the Constitution or was embodied in the constitutional 
document itself is not particularly relevant to the present inquiry. There 
was consensus concerning the model of political society as based on a 
compact among individuals. For example, James Madison described 
"the federal union [ under the Articles of Confederation] as anal[ o ]gous 
to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, 
and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous 
act of the component members .... " 192 Thus, the union, if not the 
Constitution itself, was conceptualized as being a compact. The only 
difference of opinion that existed concerned whether constitutions 
represented the embodiment of this compact or were somehow more 
solid and permanent than a mere compact. 
B. States as Contracting Parties 
Not only individuals, but also states could be viewed as existing in a 
state of nature from which they might form a social compact, establish-
ing a "system" of political societies. This was the analytical approach 
taken by Vattel in his influential work, The Law of Nations or the 
Principles of Natural Law.193 It was also the model that was some-
language of the Constitution,'' had "a tendency to impair, and indeed to destroy, its 
express powers and objects," and involved "consequences which, at the will of a single 
State, may overthrow the Constitution itself." Id. at 260-61. 
191. 2 id. at 237 n.3. 
192. I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 314. 
193. See VA TIEL, supra note 36, at 3a ("There is no doubt of the existence of a 
natural Law of Nations, inasmuch as the Law of Nature is no less binding upon States, 
where men are united in a political society, than it is upon the individuals themselves."). 
Vattel argued that just as the law of nature applied to men, it also applied to states as 
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times used to describe the systems established under the Articles of 
Confederation and the Constitution. For example, Alexander Hamilton 
described the "social compact" existing among the states under the 
Articles of Confederation in The Federalist No. 21.194 In The Federal-
ist No. 33, while justifying the supremacy of federal laws, Hamilton 
similarly analogized the formation of the union under the Constitution 
to the formation of a group of individuals into a "state of society."195 
Similarly, James Madison recognized that in the United States the states, 
which he defined as "the people composing those political societies, in 
entities. According to Vattel, "(A]s the natural law in its proper sense is the Law of 
Nature for individuals, being founded upon man's nature, so the natural Law of Nations 
is the Law of Nature for political societies, being founded on the nature of these 
societies," Id. at 7a, notej. Vattel stated that the law of nations was merely the law of 
nature applied to states. 
[T]he Law of Nations is in its origin merely the Law of Nature applied to 
Nations. Now the just and reasonable application of a rule requires that the 
application be made in a manner suited to the nature of the subject; but we 
must not conclude that the Law of Nations is everywhere and at all points the 
same as the natural law, except for a difference of subjects, so that no other 
change need be made than to substitute Nations for individuals. 
Id. at 4. Vattel also noted that states were subject to the law of nature. 
We have already seen that men, when united in society, remain subject to the 
obligations of the Law of Nature. This society may be regarded as a moral 
person, since it has an understanding, a will, and a power peculiar to itself; 
and it is therefore obliged to live with other societies or States according to the 
laws of natural society of the human race, just as individual men before the 
establishment of civil society lived according to them; with such exceptions, 
however, as are due to the difference of the subjects. 
Id. at 6. Christian Wolff, another early commentator on international law, had similar 
notions concerning the relations among states. See CHRISTIAN WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM 
METHODO SCIENT!FICA PERTRACTATUM § 7, at 11 (Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934) (1764) 
( discussing the role of nature in creating a "society among all nations" much as it creates 
societies "among individuals"). Pufendorf seems to have taken a similar approach. See 
PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORIJM JURJSPRIJDENTJAE UNIVERSALIS LmRI Duo, supra note 177, 
at 64 ("[T]he things we are saying about the law of nature and the duties of individuals 
can easily be applied to whole states and nations that have also coalesced into one moral 
person."). 
194. THE FEDERALIST No. 21, at 125 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976). 
195. Hamilton described the fonnation of the union as follows: 
If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws of that society must be the 
supreme regulator of their conduct If a number of political societies enter into 
a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the 
powers intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme over 
those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed. It would 
otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of the parties, and !lot 
a government .... 
Id. No. 33, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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their highest sovereign capacity," were "parties to the [constitutional] 
compact."196 
Antifederalists also understood the Constitution as a compact among 
the states as political societies. For example, one Antifederalist made 
the following remarks in commenting on the federal system in the 
United States: 
As individuals in a state of nature surrender a portion of their natural liberty to 
the society of which they become members, in order to receive in lieu thereof 
protection and conveniency; so in forming a federal republic the individual 
states surrender a part of their separate sovereignty to the general government 
or federal bead, in order that, whilst they respectively enjoy internally the 
freedom and happiness peculiar to free republics, they may possess all that 
externa1 protection, security, and weight by their confederated resources, that 
can possibly be obtained in the most extended, absolute monarchies. 197 
Thus, there was widespread adherence to this model of a "federal 
republic" as being based upon a compact among both Federalists and 
Antifederalists. 
Finally, and most importantly, the letter accompanying the Constitu-
tion when it was sent to the state legislatures for submission to 
ratification conventions in each state also analogized the states to 
individuals entering into a compact. 198 In explaining why the states 
did not retain every aspect of their original sovereignty under the 
Constitution, the letter stated: 
It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these states, to 
secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the 
interest and safety of all: Individuals entering into society, must give up a share 
of liberty to preserve the rest The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as 
well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all 
times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must 
be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the present occasion 
this difficulty was increased by a difference aino1W the several states as to their 
situation, extent, habits, and particular interests.1 
196. Report of 1800 (Jan. 7, 1800), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 309 
(David B. Mattern et al. eds., l 962). 
I 97. 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note Io. at I 83-84. 
198. For a discussion of this letter, see Farber, supra note 2. 
199. Letter of the President of the Federal Convention to the President of Congress 
(Sept. 17, 1787), in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF nm FORMATION OF nm UNION OF 
TiiE AMERICAN STATES 1003 {Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927). The letter also recognized 
that it was the consent of the states that was necessary for ratification, conceding that 
the Constitution "will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is not perhaps 
to be expected .... " Id. 
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Thus, social compact theory as it was developed prior to the ratification 
period contemplated both states as well as individuals as compacting 
parties. Social compact theory was expanded by Vattel and applied to 
states in order to analyze problems arising in international law. 
However, the same theories may be applied to relations among the states 
in the federal system established by the Constitution. 
C. The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution 
The model of society as being based upon a compact among either 
individuals or states may be applied to the federal systems established 
under the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. Such an 
analysis indicates that, although both documents established confederate 
republics, the fundamental difference between the Articles and the 
Constitution is that the latter represented a compact among both the 
people and the states, whereas the former represented a compact among 
the states alone. In other words, the Constitution represented merely a 
partial consolidation of the states--the Constitution was not purely a 
compact among the people as a nation or the states as entities. Several 
structural provisions of the Constitution support this interpretation, 
including the bicameral legislature, the original appointment of Senators 
by state legislatures, equal representation of the states in the Senate, the 
electoral college, reservation of residual powers to the states and the 
people, and the provisions governing ratification and amendment of the 
Constitution. 
1. Confederate Republics 
Both systems established under the Articles of Confederation and 
under the Constitution might be termed "federal,"200 "confederal," or 
"confederate" republics.201 To use the terminology of Madison, they 
200. 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 183-84. 
201. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 16, at 97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976) (arguing that the "federal system" should be "speedily renovated"); id. No. 
22, at 131 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the "existing federal system" under the 
Articles); I WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 262-63 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967) 
("[T]he United States have been formed into one confederate republick; first, under the 
articles of confederation; afterwards, under our present national government11); 2 id. at 
764 (stating that the Constitution was "a plan of a confederate republic!:''); id. at 768 
(stating that in "confederate republick[s]," states "retain the free and generous exercise 
of all their other faculties as states, so far as it is compatible with the welfare of the 
general and superintending confederacy''). See also ONUF & ONUF, supra note 3 I, at 
55 (noting that "the usage of the time made the tenns 'confederate' and 'federal' 
effectively synonymous"). 
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were "compound" rather than "simple" republics.202 Both Federalists 
and Antifederalists described the union among the states in such terms. 
As previously noted,203 Alexander Hamilton had referred to 
Montesquieu's definition of a "confederate republic" in describing the 
union among the states. Based on Montesquieu's discussion of this form 
of government, Hamilton concluded: "The definition of a confederate 
republic seems simply to be 'an assemblage of societies,' or an 
association of two or more states into one state."204 Thus, Hamilton 
recognized that states could form an "assemblage" much as individuals 
did in creating the states themselves. In such confederate republics it 
was important that the compact guarantee the continued existence of the 
constituent states. Hamilton argued that 
[s]o long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long 
as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should 
be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still 
be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The 
proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State govern-
ments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing 
them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain 
exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. This fully 
corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal 
government 205 
202. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 339 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) 
(Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976) ("In the compound republic of America, the power 
surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then 
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments."). 
Madison also made a distinction between "national" and "federal" governments. 
According to Madison, 
The proposed Constitution ... is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal 
Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not 
national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are 
drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, 
it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not 
national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it 
is neither wholly federal nor wholly national. 
Id. No. 39, at 250 (James Madison). The fact that the Constitution was a "composite" 
was a result of the nature of the union a-s being among both the states and the people. 
As Madison noted, the only aspect of the Constitution that was primarily national was 
the fact that the general government could legislate on individuals. However, it could 
also legislate for states in certain circumstances, indicating that even in this it could not 
be characterized as being completely national. 
203. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
204. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). 
205. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the key to maintaining the federal structure in a confederate 
republic was a constitutional protection for the continued existence of the 
states as entities. Textual provisions such as those guaranteeing the 
equal representation of the states in the Senate, direct election of the 
Senate by state legislatures, and the electoral college, all ensured the 
continued existence of the states as entities in the governmental 
structure.206 As James Madison noted, such structural features of the 
Constitution ensured that the states would remain "constituent and 
essential parts of the federal govemment."207 
Not swprisingly, Antifederalists also emphasized this fundamental 
characteristic of confederate or federal republics. For example, one 
Antifederalist described such systems as follows: 
To erect a federal republic, we must first make a number of states on republican 
principles; each state with a government organized for the internal management 
of its affairs: The states, as such, must unite under a federal bead, and delegate 
to it powers to make and execute laws in certain enwnerated cases, under 
certain restrictions . . . . A federal republic in itself supposes state or local 
governments to exist, as the body or props, on which the federal head rests, and 
that it cannot remain a moment after they cease. In erecting the federal 
government, and always in its councils, each state must be known as a 
sovereign body; but in erecting this government, I conceive, the legislature of 
the state, by the expressed or implied assent of the people, or the people of the 
state, under the direction of the government of it, may accede to the federal 
compact. 208 
Thus, the Antifederalists as well as the Federalists viewed the essential 
character of a federal republic as one in which republican state 
governments were parties to the federal compact establishing the union. 
206. See supra notes 108-111 (discussing such structures). 
207. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 301 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). Madison elaborated: 
Id. 
The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of 
the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation 
or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legisla-
tures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must 
in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most 
cases, of themselves detennine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and 
exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of Representatives, 
though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under 
the influence of that class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for 
themselves an election into the State legislatures. 
208. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 10, at 331. It is interesting 
to note that in this passage an emphasis is placed on the fact that enumerated and limited 
powers are delegated to the general government, perhaps indicating that such a structural 
feature is essential to federal republics. But see supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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All governmental authority was still derived ultimately from the 
people.209 The states derived political authority from the peoples of 
the several states. Therefore, any authority derived from the states was 
derived indirectly from the peoples of the several states. 
The Federalists viewed the union as one of the people as well as the 
states, a structure that was reflected in many of the provisions of the 
Constitution. The Antifederalists objected to any form of government 
representing a consolidation of the states--one in which the states as 
entities were not contracting parties. However, as the Federalists argued, 
the Constitution represented merely a partial consolidation since the 
union that it established was one of the people as a whole as well as the 
states as entities. 
2. The Constitution: A Partial Consolidation 
The greatest flaw in the Articles of Confederation, according to 
Federalists, was the fact that the general government was one established 
by the states as entities, rather than the people directly. After discussing 
a number of historical and contemporary examples of confederacies, 
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 20, 
Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they 
ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally 
pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a 
government over governments, a legislation for communities, as 
contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice 
it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting violence in 
209. For example, James Madison noted that even though the consent of a majority 
of the people and a majority of the states was necessary for constitutional lawmaking, 
both the state and federal governments derived their political authority ultimately from 
the people, since under republican principles of government all sovereignty ultimately 
resided with the people. In The Federalist No. 46, Madison stated: 
The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees 
of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different 
purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the 
people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these 
different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as 
uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities 
of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They 
must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, 
resides in the people alone .... 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 304-05 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
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place of law, or the destructive coercion of the sword in place of the mild and 
salutary coercion of the magistracy.210 
Thus, Madison and Hamilton noted the defects of confederacies where 
the general government was not a government established by a compact 
among the people themselves, but only the states. From the discussions 
of such political unions given by Pufendorf and Vattel, it appears that 
this was the dominant form of confederacy prior to ratification of the 
Constitution. A consequence of this structural feature of the Articles 
was that the Congress legislated for the states, rather than the people, in 
most cases.211 As Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 15, 
210. Id. No. 20, at 124 (Alexander Hamilton & James Madison). Alexander 
Hamilton reiterated this position in The Federalist No. 27: 
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one 
proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than that 
species of league contended for by most of its opponents; the authority of 
which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective 
capacities. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no 
sanction for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are 
the natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as often as 
these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence. 
Id. No. 27, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton). James Madison also made this point in The 
Federalist No. 37 in which he stated that "the existing Confederation is founded on 
principles which are fallacious ... we must consequently change this first foundation, 
and with it the superstructure resting upon it." Id. No. 37, at 226 (James Madison). 
211. This was not always the case under the Articles. For example, James Madison 
noted, "In some instances, . . . those [powers] of the existing government act 
immediately on individuals,, and cited "cases of capture; of piracy; of the post office; 
of coins, weights, and measures; of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land 
by different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by courts-martial in the army and 
navy •... " Id. No. 40, at 254 (James Madison). See also Freedman, supra note 59, 
at 151-53 (describing the use of the court-martial power and enforcement of treaty 
provisions and commercial regulations). Madison also pointed out that the Constitution 
would act on the states in their collective capacities in certain cases: 
The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to 
the operation of the government, is supposed to consist in this, that in the 
fonner the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, 
in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing 
the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this 
criterion, it falls under the national, not the federal character; though perhaps 
not so completely as has been understood. In several cases .•• [the states] 
must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political 
capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this 
side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is 
perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the 
people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential 
proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a national 
government 
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 248 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). See 
also Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 791 (1982) (O'Connor, J,, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "[t]he Constitution ... permitt[ ed] 
direct contact between the National Governmep.t and the individual citizen"). 
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The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is 
in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their 
CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the 
INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through 
all the powers delegated to the Union! ret it pervades and governs those on 
which the efficacy of the rest depends. 1 
212. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 89 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). Later, Hamilton concluded: 
(l]f we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is 
the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common 
council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which 
may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league 
and a government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons 
of the citizens,-the only proper objects of government 
Id. at 91. In The Federalist No. 16, Hamilton used a comparative approach in decrying 
the form of government that existed under the Articles, which legislated merely for states 
in their 11political capacities": 
The tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or conununities, in 
their po1itica1 capacities, as it has been exemplified by the experiment we have 
made of it, is equally attested by the events which have befallen all other 
governments of the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact 
proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of this fact 
will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination. I shall content myself 
with barely observing here, that of all the confederacies of antiquity, which 
histo,y has handed down to us, the Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as 
there remain vestiges of them, appear to have been most free from the fetters 
of that mistaken principle, and were accordingly those which have best 
deserved, and have most liberally received, the applauding suffiages of 
political writers. 
Id. No. 16, at 95 {Alexander Hamilton). See also 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 197 (remarks of Oliver Ellsworth in the Connecticut 
convention) ('"This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies> states, in 
their political capacity . . . . But this legal coercion singles out the .•. individual."); 4 
id. at 256 (remarks of Charles Pinckney before the South Carolina House of Representa-
tives) ("[T]he necessity of having a government which should at once operate upon the 
people, and not upon the states, was conceived to be indispensable by eve,y delegation 
present"); 2 id. at 56 (remarks of Rufus King) ("Laws, to be effective, therefore, must 
not be laid on states, but upon individuals."). Hamilton also noted the importance of 
granting the federal government the power to legislate for the people directly; 
But can we believe that one state will ever suffer itself to be used as an 
instrument of coercion? The thing is a dream; it is impossible. Thus we are 
brought to this dilemma-either a federal standing army is to enforce the 
requisitions, or the federal treasury is left without supplies, and the government 
without support What, sir, is the cure for this great evil? Nothing, but to 
enable the national laws to operate on individuals, in the same manner as those 
of the states do. · 
2 id. at 233 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton at the New York Convention). Cf. 4 id. 
at 153 (remarks of Samuel Spencer at the North Carolina Convention) ("[A]ll the laws 
of the Confederation were binding on th~ states in their political capacities, ... but now 
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Thus, the Articles truly represented a compact among states, rather than 
a compact among the people themselves. 
Antifederalists argued time and again that the Constitution represented 
a "consolidation" of the states.213 As Antifederalist Patrick Henry 
noted, "If the states be not the agents of this compact, it must be one 
great, consolidated, national government, of the people of all the states, 
. . . Here is a resolution as radical as that which separated us from 
Great Britain."214 The Federalists went to great pains to argue that the 
Constitution did not represent a complete "consolidation" of the 
states215 and even _that there was no danger of a consolidation under 
the thing is entirely different. The laws of Congress will be binding on individuals,"), 
213. See 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 134 
(remarks of Antifederalist Samuel Nasson at the Massachusetts ratifying convention) 
(arguing that if the preamble of the Constitution "does not go to an annihilation of the 
state governments, and to a perfect consolidation of the whole Union, I do not know 
what does"). Patrick Henry, in particular, noted the danger of consolidation: 
The fate •.. of America may depend on this. • • • Have they made a proposal 
of a compact between states? If they had, this would be a confederation. It 
is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government The question turns, sir, 
on that poor little thing-the expression, We, the people, instead of the states, 
of America. 
3 id. at 44 (remarks of Antifederalist Patrick Henry at Virginia ratifying convention). 
See also HERBERT J. STORING, WHATTIIE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERBFOR 10-1 I, 15-23 
(1981); WOOD, supra note 1, at 526 (concluding that the Antifederalists "had no doubt 
that it was precisely an absorption of all the states under one unified government that 
the Constitution intended, and they therefore offered this prospect of an inevitable 
consolidation as the strongest and most scientifically based objection to the new system 
that they could muster"); BERGER., FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN, supra note 2, 
at 56 (arguing that the colonists were "[c]onvinced that the distant British government 
had oppressed them ... [and] were little minded to put their trust in a remote federal 
government''); 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 45 
(statement ofFisher Ames) ("[N]o argument •.• bas made a deeper impression than this, 
that [the Constitution] will produce a consolidation of the states."). 
At least part of the normative argument against consolidation rested on the diversity 
found within the several states. See 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, 
supra note 47, at 639 ("So long as climate will have effect on men, so long will the 
different climates of the United States render us different Therefore a consolidation is 
contrary to our nature, and can only be supported by an arbitrary government."). 
Edward Carrington, for example, noted the great diversity throughout the States: 
[G]eneral Laws through a Country embracing so many climates, productions, 
and manners, as the United States, would operate many oppressions, & a 
general legislature would be found incompetent to the formation of local ones, 
as a majority would, in every instance, be ignorant of, and unaffected by the 
objects of legislation. 
Letter from Edward Carrington to Thomas Jefferson (June 9, 1787), in 3 RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9s at 38. 
214. 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 22, 44 
(remarks of Antifederalist Patrick Henry). 
215. For example, Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 9: 
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the plan of the Constitution.216 The government under the Constitution 
A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a 
confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The essential characteristic of 
the first is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in their 
collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are 
composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern 
with any object of internal administration. An exact equalicy of suffrage 
between the members bas also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a 
confederate government These positions are, in the main, arbitrary; they are 
supported neither by principle nor precedent It bas indeed happened, that 
governments of this kind have generally operated in the manner which the 
distinction, taken notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there 
have been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which serve 
to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute rule on the 
subject. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 51-52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976); 
id. No. 32, at 194 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[A]s the plan of the convention aims only at 
a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would clearly retain all the rights 
of sovereigncy which they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively 
delegated to the United States."); Letter from James Madison to George Washington 
(Apr. 16, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 382, 383 (Robert A Rutland et al. 
eds., 1975) (noting that "a consolidation of the whole into one simple republic would be 
as inexpedient as it is unattainable"). Madison noted the utter undesirabilicy of a 
complete consolidation of the states: 
I hold it for a fundamental point that an individual independence of the States, 
is utterly irreconcileable [sic] with the idea of an aggregate sovereigncy. I 
think at the same time that a consolidation of the States into one simple 
republic is not less unattainable than it would be inexpedient. Let it be tried 
then whether any middle ground can be taken which will at once support a due 
supremacy of the national authority, and leave in force the local authorities so 
far as they can be subordinately useful. 
Letter From James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra, at 368, 369. See also STORING, supra note 213, at 12. Herbert Storing 
also noted that: 
the characteristic Federalist position was to deny that the choice lay between 
confederation and consolidation and to contend that in fact the Constitution 
provided a new fonn, partly national and partly federal. This was Publius' 
argument in The Federalist, no. 39. It was Madison's argument in the 
Virginia ratifying convention. And it was the usual argument of James Wilson 
himself, who emphasized the strictly limited powers of the general government 
and the essential part to be played in it by the states. 
Id. It is instructive to note the insistence of opponents of the Constitution on equal 
representation of the states. The fact that the union under the Constitution was both a 
union of the people as well as a union of the states explains the lack of equalicy in the 
House of Representatives. Some members of the modem Supreme Court have 
recognized the distinction made between a partial and a complete consolidation. See, 
e.g., U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 792 (1995) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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was to remain a "compound republic."217 They certainly desired to 
have the general government established based on the political authority 
of the people directly.218 However, the states were also to remain 
parties to the social compact. James Madison termed this structure a 
"mixed Constitution."219 Several structural provisions of the Constitu-
tion clearly indicate that it represented merely a partial consolidation of 
the states. 
2 I 6. One concern, besides the amendment power under Article V, was the extent 
of the powers granted to the general government Madison attempted to assuage 
concerns that the general government would usurp greater powers in The Federalist No. 
45: 
We have seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies, the 
strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil the 
general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the 
latter to defend itself against the encroachments. . . . In the Achaean league 
it is probable that the federal bead had a degree and species of power, which 
gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. 
The Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and fonn are transmitted, must 
have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not infonn us that 
either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated 
government 
TllE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 299-300 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
217. Id. NO. 62, at 401 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). 
218. Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 27: 
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the 
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the 
government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its 
laws. It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common 
apprehension, all distinction between the sources from which they might 
proceed; and will give the federal government the same advantage for securing 
a due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each 
State, in addition to the influence on public opinion which will result from the 
important consideration of its having power to call to its assistance and support 
the resources of the whole Union. 
Id. No. 27, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton). This was also the accepted position soon after 
ratification of the Constitution. See. e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall,) 199, 235 
(l 796) ("There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. 
By their authority, the state constitutions were made, and by their authority the 
constitution of the United States was established ...• "); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 
(2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (noting that ''the people, in their collective and 
national capacity, established the present Constitution"); id. at 454 (Wilson, J,) (noting 
that the people "might have announced themselves 'SOVEREIGN' people of the United 
States: but serenely conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration"), 
219. TllE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 250 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). Madison noted that under the Constitution the states were to be "regarded as 
distinct and independent sovereigns." Id. at 253. 
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a. Bicameralism and Equal Representation of the 
States in the Senate 
It is the accepted wisdom that the "great compromise" that resulted in 
the equal representation of the states in the Senate and direct representa-
tion of the people in the House of Representatives was just that-a 
compromise. 220 However, the nature of the union as being both a 
union of the states as entities as well as a union of the people in their 
individual capacities indicates that the Great Compromise may have been 
more than merely a political expedient designed to secure ratification of 
the Constitution by both large and small states.221 Representation of 
220. See FARRAND, supra note 29, at 127-28. Nationalists at the Constitutional 
Convention had desired that representation in the Senate be based on population. See 
M.E. BRADFORD, ORIGINAL INTENTIONS ON TIIE MAKING AND RATIFICATION OF TIIE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 9 (1993); Monaghan, supra note 2, at 141-42 ( discussing 
the goals of nationalists). 
The author of The Federalist No. 62 recognized the nature of the provision for an 
equality of representation of the states in the Senate as being ''the result of compromise 
between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small states" and therefore not 
worthy of "much discussion.'' However, The Federalist No. 62 continues, t,ying to 
justify the provision for an equality of representation on theoretical grounds. 
If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one 
nation, every district ought to have a proportional share in the government, 
and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple 
league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in 
the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a 
compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character, the 
government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional 
and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of 
theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the 
result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and 
concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered 
indispensible." 
THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 40 I {Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (Edward Mead 
Earle ed., 1976). Thus, although the provision was admittedly born of compromise, a 
theoretical justification could be made for it 
221. An additional reason offered for dividing the legislatore had to do with the 
danger inherent in delegating the federal government greater powers. As Alexander 
Hamilton stated, 
The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the exercise of 
those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the Union. A single 
assembly may be a proper receptacle of those slender, or rather fettered, 
authorities, which have been heretofore delegated to the federal bead; but it 
would be inconsistent with all the principles of good government, to intrust it 
with those additional powers which,. even the moderate and more rational 
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the states in one house of the legislature and the people in the other may 
have a solid foundation in theory.= Under the Constitution, both the 
states as entities as well as the people had representatives in the general 
govemment.223 As James Madison noted in The Federalist No. 39, the 
House of Representatives was to "derive its powers from the people of 
America," and the fact that the government was to operate "on the 
people, in their individual capacities" made the new government a 
"nationaf' one in this respect.224 The states were accorded equal 
suffrage as they had been under the Articles225 in acknowledgement of 
adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in the United 
States. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 140 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
222. Statements justifying the bicameral legislature with representation in one house 
based on population and the other house having equal representation of the states 
indicate the theoretical foundations of this structure. For example, Dr. William Johnson 
of Connecticut indicated that the states were considered as "political societies11 or in their 
"political capacicy''--indicating that the theoretical notion of states as well as the people 
being parties to the social compact establishing the union under the Constitution was in 
the minds of the Founding Generation: 
The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ in the grounds of 
their arguments; Those on one side considering the States as districts of people 
composing one political Society; those on the other considering them as so 
many political societies. The fact is that the States do exist as political 
Societies, and a Govt is to be fanned for them in their political capacity, as 
well as for the individuals composing them. . . . On the whole, he thought 
that as in some respects the States are to be considered in their political 
capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens, the two ideas 
embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to 
be combined; that in one branch the people, ought to be represented; in the 
other, the States. 
Doctor William Johnson, Remarks in Debate (June 29, 1787), in I RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 461-62. 
223. 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 46 
(statement of Fisher Ames) ("The state governments are essential parts of the system . 
. . . [T]he senators represent the sovereignty of the states.''), 
224. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 247-48 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). See also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 404-05 (1819) ("The 
government of the Union ..• is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. 
In form and in substance ii emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and 
are to be exercised directly on them, acd for their benefit."). 
225. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art V (declaring that "each State shall have 
one vote"). The equal suffrage of the states under the Articles was attacked by 
Federalists as being acti-republicac. For example, Alexander Hamilton stated in The 
Federalist No. 22, 
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The right of equal suffrage among the States is another exceptionable part 
of the Confederation ...• Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of 
republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should 
prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, acd that a majority of 
the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. But this 
kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of 
justice and common-sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a 
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the fact that the Constitution represented a compact among the states as 
well as the people. The equal suffrage of the states in the Senate was 
one mechanism by which the continued existence of the states as 
entities-parties to the national compact-was recognized and given 
constitutional protection. As The Federalist No. 62 stated, 
[T]he equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition 
of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an 
instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought 
to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not 
less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper 
consolidation of the States into one simple republic.226 
The Federalist No. 62 characterized the government under the Constitu-
tion as a "compound republic" rather than a "simple republic," which 
would have resulted were there a complete consolidation of the states. 
This is perfectly consistent with the theory of the Constitution as 
representing a compact not only among the people as a whole, but also 
among the states as entities. As The Federalist No. 62 noted, "[n]o law 
or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a 
majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States."217 Thus, 
the bicameral legislature reflects the fact that because the Constitution 
is a compact of both the states and the people, the consent of a majority 
of both groups is necessary for action by the general government. 
Importantly, the provision for equality of suffrage in the Senate could 
not be amended under the Entrenchment Clause of Article V.218 As 
small minority of the people of America. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
226. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) 
(Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). James Madison made similar observations in The 
Federalist No. 39: 
The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of 
America; and the people will be represeoted in the same proportion, and on the 
same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the 
government is national, not federal. The Seoate, on the other hand, will 
derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these 
will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are 
in the existing Congress. So far the government is federal, not national. 
Id. No. 39, at 247 (James Madison). Thus, Madison recognized the differeot sources of 
political authority of the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
227. Id. No. 62, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison). 
228. See U.S. CONST. art. V. This exception was introduced without opposition. 
See Debate of Sept 15, 1787 in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 
9, at 631 ("This motion being dictated by the circulating munnurs of the small States 
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James Madison noted in The Federalist No. 43, "[t]he exception [in 
Article V] in favor of the equality of suffrage in the Senate, was 
probably meant as a palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, 
implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of 
the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States particularly 
attached to that equality."229 Thus, this feature of the Constitution was 
truly a constitutional essential. As James Iredell noted in debates in the 
North Carolina ratifying convention, "in order that no consolidation 
should take place, it is provided that no state shall, by any amendment 
or alteration, be ever deprived of an equal suffrage in the Senate without 
its own consent."23° Consistent with social compact theory, a majority 
of the parties to the compact must give their consent to governmental 
action--in this case, a majority of the people as well as the states. Just 
as "all men are created equal," all states enjoy an equality in the state of 
nature.231 Thus, the provisions in the Articles of Confederation 
was agreed to without debate, no one opposing it, or on the question, saying no.") 
(footnote omitted). Prior to this addition, Roger Sherman had offered a motion that 
would "annex to the end of the article a further proviso 'that no State shall without its 
consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of its equal suffrage in the 
Senate.'" Roger Sherman, Remarks in Debate (Sept 15, 1787), in 2 id. at 620, 630. 
However, this motion failed as did Sherman's motion to remove Article V completely. 
Debate of Sept 15, 1787, in 2 id. at 621, 630-31. 
229. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 286-87 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976) (emphasis added). See also St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the 
United States, in l BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 141-42 app. note D (St. George 
Tucker ed., 1803) (noting that the states were "constituent and necessaiy parts of the 
federal government,n without which "there could be neither a senate, nor a president''); 
James Wilson, Remarks in Debate (June 19, 1787), in 1 RECORDS OF TilE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 329, 330 ("! don! [sic] agree that the Genl. Govt. will 
swallow up the states . . • • I think they must be preserved they must be continued •.. 
our Country is too extensive for a single Govt •.•. "), Thornton Anderson has 
concluded that the nationalists were defeated in 1787: 
This focus on the states makes it clear that the defeat of the nationalists on the 
Connecticut compromise was not confined to the Senate or to the structure of 
the government Here at the end of the Convention their opponents were 
relentlessly building the equality of states into the foundations of the system 
whence it could reassert itself on all future amendments. The idea of a single 
national body politic whose people were the source of supreme power, and 
therefore of the supreme law, was not even a debatable position. 
THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND 
TilE FIRST CONGRESS 160 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
230. 4 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 177 
(statement of James Iredell). See also I id. at 315-17; 5 id. at 551. 
231. Vattel made this point in his Law of Nations: 
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Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations are 
the same, as coming equally from nature, Nations, which are composed of men 
and may be regarded as so many free persons living together in a state of 
nature, are by nature equal and hold from nature the same obligations and the 
same rights. 
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ensuring the equality of the states in Congress and the provisions in the 
Constitution enshrining equality of representation in the Senate may be 
explained by referring to the first principles of social compact theory. 
Bicameralism might be viewed as a theoretical outgrowth of the nature 
of the compact establishing the union. 
b. The Electoral College 
The compound nature of the compact establishing the general 
government may be seen not only in the legislative department, but also 
in the executive. The procedural mechanisms for the election of the 
President represent another illustration of the fact that the union in the 
United States was one of the people and the states. James Madison 
recognized this characteristic of the Constitution in The Federalist No. 
39. According to Madison, 
The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The 
immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political 
characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers 
them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the 
same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the 
legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular 
act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many 
distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the govemmeot it 
appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many federal as 
national features.232 
Thus, the seemingly incomprehensible electoral college mechanism also 
finds a theoretical basis in the theory of the Constitution as being based 
on a compact among both the states and the people. 
c. Residual Powers Retained by the States and the People 
As previously noted,233 the Constitution reserved powers to the 
people as well as the states. Under the Articles, powers were textually 
reserved to the states alone. This situation is explicable if one keeps in 
VA TIEL, supra note 36, at lxii. 
232. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 247-48 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). See also id. No. 45, at 301 (James Madison) ("Without the intervention of the 
State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must 
in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of 
themselves detennine it"). 
233. See supra notes 168.69 and accompanying text. 
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mind the fact that the Constitution was a compact among the people as 
well as the states. The people as well as the states could be viewed as 
delegating powers to the general government. Therefore, a rule for 
determining where residual power was to lie was necessary with respect 
to both the people and the states. James Madison recognized that, in this 
respect, the government established under the Constitution was a federal 
and not a national one. According to Madison, 
The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the 
individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so 
far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated 
into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature, 
Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the 
general and partly in the municipal legislatures. . • • In this relation, then, the 
proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction 
extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.234 
Thus, the fact that residual powers were retained by the states under the 
Constitution is an indication that the union established under the 
Constitution remained at least partially one of the states as entities. 
d. Amendment 
Like the bicameral legislature erected in Article I with direct 
representation of the people in the House of Representatives and equal 
representation of the states in the Senate, the rules for amendment of the 
Constitution found in Article V also reflect the nature of the compact 
establishing the union as being one among the people as well as the 
states as entities. James Madison noted in The Federalist No. 39 that the 
mechanism for amendment under Article V reflected that the union was 
one of the states as well as the people. According to Madison, 
If we tty the Constitution by its last relation, to the authority by which 
amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly national, nor wholly 
federal. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would 
reside in the majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be 
competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter 
or abolish its established Government Were it wholly federal on the other 
hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every 
alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the 
Convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than 
a majority, and particularly, in computing the proportion by States, not by 
citizens, it departs from the national, and advances towards the federal 
234. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 248-49 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). 
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character: In rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States 
sufficient, it loses again the federal, and partakes of the national character."' 
Thus, the rules found in Article V for amendment of the Constitution 
illustrate the nature of the union as being based on a compact to which 
both the states and people are parties. 236 Article V may be viewed, 
therefore, as being merely descriptive of the first principles governing 
the Constitution itself. It does not pretend to place any limitations on 
the power of the people that are not already dictated by the nature of the 
union, other than the two limited exceptions for slave importation and 
equal suffrage of the states in the Senate. Even these two exceptions 
may have explanations based on the theory presented above. The equal 
suffrage of the states may have been thought to be dictated by the nature 
of the union as a compact among the states as well as the people.237 
Therefore, the only purely practical compromise in Article V seems to 
be the Slave Importation Clause, which would bind only the generation 
ratifying the Constitution-perhaps representing a commitment of that 
generation not to use its amendment power to end slave importation. As 
The Federalist No. 49 aptly states, "a constitutional road to the decision 
of the people ought to be marked out and kept open, for certain great 
and extraordinary occasions."238 Article V merely "mark[s] out" this 
road that the Framers thought was dictated by the political principles 
governing the Constitution. 
The procedures for amendment of the Constitution recognize the 
nature of the union as being based on an agreement of both the states 
and the people. Although the ultimate sovereignty from which the 
Constitution derives its authority lies with "We the People," there is both 
a direct as well as an indirect channel through which the sovereignty of 
the people is expressed. The Constitution therefore represellts a compact 
among both the people of the United States as well as the peoples of the 
235. Id. at 249-50. 
236. Thus, the Constitution did not represent a "consolidation.u See A Freeman II, 
PENN. GAZETTE (Jan. 30, 1788), reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF TIIE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: CoMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTl1lJTION 511 (John 
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY: 
COMMENTARIES] (arguing that the fact that two-thirds of the states could propose 
amendments and that three-fourths of the states only could ratify amendments meant that 
no consolidation was possible under the proposed Constitution). 
237. See supra notes 220-31 and accompanying text 
238. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 328 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) 
(Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
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United States through the agency of the states. Because the states have 
''republican" forms of government, they are ultimately creatures of the 
people as well. However, they are creatures of the various peoples of 
the several states. Under social compact theory, the political authority 
to abolish or alter any given state government rests with the people of 
that state alone-the parties to the compact upon which the state 
government was formed. This theoretical principle is arguably 
recognized by the Guarantee Clause, through which the republican nature 
of the state governments was guaranteed to continue under the new 
Constitution.239 The danger under the Constitution, which the 
Antifederalists recognized, is that arguably the document could be 
construed in such a way that three-fourths of the peoples of the several 
states could abolish a given state without the consent of the people of 
that state. However, the fact that the Constitution itself declares that the 
equal suffrage of the states in the Senate cannot be destroyed and that 
the states will retain republican forms of government argues against such 
an interpretation. Inequality of the states or the abolition of any state is 
inconsistent with the theoretical principles informing the Constitution. 
e. Ratification 
The fact that the Articles of Confederation were not ratified by the 
people themselves, but rather by the state legislatures, is an indication 
that the compact forming the government under the Articles was not one 
of the people, but only one of the states as entities.240 In contrast, the 
Constitution was to be ratified by the people of the several states. James 
Madison noted this feature of the Constitution in The Federalist No. 39 
239. See supra notes 142-56 and accompanying text. 
240. As Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 22, the fact that the 
Articles were not ratified by the people was one factor contributing to the weakness of 
the general government: 
It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal system, 
that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation 
than the consent of the several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and 
intricate questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some 
instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of legislative repeal. 
Owing its ratification to the law of a State, it has been contended that the same 
authority might repeal the law by which it was ratified. However gross a 
heresy it may be to maintain that a party to a compact has a right to revoke 
that compact, the doctrine itself bas had respectable advocates .••• The fabric 
of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF nm 
PEOPLE. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 140-41 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). See also id. No. 43, at 287 (James Madison) (arguing that the Constitution could 
replace the Articles of Confederation because "in many of the States [they] had received 
no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification"), 
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and argued that it illustrated the federal character of the government. 
According to Madison, 
On examining the first relation [the foundation on which the government is 
established], it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded on 
the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected 
for the special purpose; but, on the othert that this assent and ratification is to 
be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as 
composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively 
belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from 
the supreme authority in each State, -the authority of the people themselves. 
The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a national, but a 
federal act.241 
Thus, the ratification procedures of the Constitution illustrate the nature 
of the union as being one between the states as well as the people. The 
political authority of the general government was derived from the 
people, but the sovereignty of the people was expressed through the 
states as entities. As Madison noted, neither a majority of the Reople, 
nor a majority of the states alone was sufficient for ratification. 42 
241. Id. No. 39, at 246 (James Madison). See also id. at 249 ("Were [the 
Constitution] wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the 
majority of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, 
like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established 
government."). For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,403 
(1819), the Supreme Court stated that: 
The Convention which framed the constitution was indeed elected by the State 
legislatures. But the instrument .•. was submitted to the people. . • . It is 
true, they assembled in their several States-and where else should they have 
assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking 
down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American 
people into one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in 
their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be 
the measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State 
governments. 
Id. 
242. Madison continued: 
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are understood 
by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so many independent States, 
not as forming one aggregate nation, is obvious from this single consideration, 
that it is to result neither from the decision of a majority of the people of the 
Union, nor from that of a majority of the States. It must result from the 
unanimous assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no 
otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed, not by the 
legislative authority, but by that of the people themselves. Were the people 
regarded in this transaction as forming one nation, the will of the majority of 
the whole people of the United States would bind the minority, in the same 
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In the context of ratification, like amendment, a simple majority of the 
people or the states was not deemed sufficient to ratify the Constitution. 
Ratification by the people of nine of the thirteen states was deemed 
necessary to give binding effect to the Constitution.243 The require-
ment that nine of the thirteen states ratify the Constitution may have 
been an attempt to roughly approximate the consent of a majority of the 
people as well as the states. Thus, the fraction nine-thirteenths comes 
close to the fraction necessary for ratification of amendments--three-
fourths-but not quite as close as a requirement often out of the thirteen 
states would have. 244 
V. APPLICATIONS 
The foregoing analysis of the provisions of the Articles of Confedera-
tion and the Constitution that established the federal structure under the 
respective systems is relevant to several current debates among legal 
academics as well as within the courts. The theory of the Constitution 
as being based on a compact among both the people and the states has 
implications for the debates over amendment outside Article V, the 
constitutionality of secession, and intezpretation of the enumerated 
powers of the general government. This Part applies the theory to these 
constitutional questions. 
manner as the majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of 
the majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual 
votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as evidence of 
the will of a majority of the people of the United States. Neither of these 
rules has been adopted. Each State, in ratifying the Constitution, is considered 
as a sovereign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by its 
own voluntary act In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if 
established, be a federal, and not a national constitution. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246-47 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). 
See also James Madison, Remarks in Debate (Aug. 31, 1787), in 2 RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 475 (noting that ratification should "require the 
concurrence of a majority of both the States and people"). 
243. U.S. CONST. art. Vil. 
244. The disparity may have been due to the realization that the fraction 9/13 was 
drawn from existing states whereas the 3/4 ratio would apply to the existing union as 
well as to an expanded union, which was contemplated by the Framers. In the future 
the ratio of small to large states might vary as states of different sizes were admitted to 
the union. Furthennore, the ratio 3/4 seems more sensible and workable than any ratio 
of the form x/13. Since 4 is less than 13, it is more likely that the number of states in 
the union at any given time would be a multiple of 4 than a multiple of 13. 
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A. Amendment Outside Article V 
One issue that has recently been heatedly contested among legal 
academics such as Bruce Ackerman,245 Akhil Amar,246 David 
Dow,247 and Henry Monaghan248 is the constitutionality of amend-
ment proceedings outside Article V. The question, more specifically, is 
whether the people retain the power to amend the Constitution in a 
manner that does not conform with the procedures established under 
Article V. The foregoing analysis of the Constitution's federal structure 
indicates that, in the strictest sense, the answer is "no." An analysis of 
the text of Article V would seem sufficient to dispel any notions that 
there is any mechanism for amendment of the Constitution other than 
that provided for in the text.249 Furthermore, an examination of the 
debates surrounding ratification of the Constitution does not seem to 
produce evidence that amendment outside Article V was contemplated 
by the Framers.250 However, the political theory underlying the 
Constitution leads one to the same conclusion. The Constitution is a 
compact among the states as well as the people. Therefore, it is 
necessary for a majority of the people as well as the states to consent to 
amendment of the document. This is what was meant when the Framers 
stated that the Constitution was only a partial consolidation of the 
states.251 
245. See Ackennan & Katya!, supra note 23 (arguing that ratification of the 
Constitution was "illegal" under the Articles of Confederation). 
246. See Amar, supra note 24. 
247. See Dow, supra note 25. 
248. See Monaghan, supra note 2. 
249. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text, discussing the text of Article 
V. As one commentator has recently noted, "[f]he only way to amend the Constitution 
is in accordance with the mechanism outlined in article V. . . . [T)he mechanism 
outlined in article V is clear, ex.elusive, and ... means what it says. There are simply 
no other ways to amend the Constitution." Dow, supra note 25, at 4 (footnote omitted). 
250. See Dow, supra note 25, at 29 (concluding that "[o]n the relatively few 
occasions when the amendment process was mentioned at the constitutional convention, 
the only mode of amendment expressly contemplated by the framers is that specified in 
article V."). See also id. at 41 n.202 (collecting citations to The Records of the Federal 
Convention where the amendment process was discussed). 
251. See supra notes 210-19 and accompanying text Thus, Monaghan is correct 
in his assertion that "Amar's 'consolidation' (i.e., national popular sovereignty) claim is 
clearly inconsistent with Madison in Federalist No. 39, and with Hamilton in Federalist 
No. 32, who goes out of bis way to deny that any such complete 'consolidation' among 
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Article V's three-fourths requirement seems to have been designed to 
ensure that both a majority of the people, considered as a whole, as well 
as a majority of the peoples of each state consented to any changes to 
the constitutional text. As .Charles Pinckney noted, "[i]f the States 
[were] equal in size and importance, a majority of the Legislatures might 
be sufficient for the grant of any new Powers; but disproportioned as 
they are and must continue for a time; a larger number may now in 
prudence be required. "252 Therefore, Article V in reality tracks the 
requirement that flows from the social compact theories that served as 
the intellectual foundation of the union. In the strictest sense, amend-
ment outside the procedures of Article V would be unconstitutional. 
I. Professor Ackerman s Theory: Structural Amendment 
In his 1993 Storrs Lectures, Professor Ackerman argued that the 
Constitution can undergo what he terms "structural amendments" outside 
the procedural confines of Article V.253 Such structural amendments 
occur during extraordinaryperiods--''constitutional moments"-when the 
populace engages in what he terms "constitutional politics," rather than 
the "normal politics" of everyday govemance.254 According to 
Ackerman, under this "dualistic" conception of political life, when "a 
series of decisive victories at the polls permits the newly triumphant 
spokesmen of the People to proclaim their new higher law from all three 
of the branches constituted by the fust three Articles . . . a structural 
amendment . . . achieves its legitimate ratification . . .. "255 Thus, the 
people may ratify amendments by voting during moments of "constitu-
tional politics," as opposed to "normal politics," in "glorious reenact-
ment[s] of the American Revolution."256 
As historical support for his argument, Ackerman points to three 
historical periods in which the Constitution underwent structural 
amendment without following the procedures laid out in Article V: 
ratification of the Constitution, ratification of the Civil War Amend-
the peoples of the several states was intended." Monaghan. supra note 2, at 137 
(footnotes omitted). 
252. Charles Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government, 1787, reprinted 
in 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 578 (Philip B Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
253. See Bruce A. Ackennan, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 
93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1051-57 (1984) (arguing that structural amendments come about 
through voter behavior, rather than through the fonnal amendment mechanism of Article 
V). 
254. Id. at I 022. 
255. Id. at 1056. 
256. Id. at 1020. 
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ments, and the New Deal.257 Ackerman argues that the ratification of 
the Constitution was "plainly illegal" under Article XIlI of the Articles 
of Confederation.258 Ratification of the Constitution violated both the 
unanimity requirement under the Articles, as well as the requirement that 
proposed amendments be submitted to the state legislatures, and not the 
people directly.259 Furthermore, Ackerman notes that several state 
constitutions had provisions declaring formal mechanisms for amend-
ment that were not followed in ratification of the new Constitution. 260 
As a result of these purported illegalities, Ackerman concludes that the 
Framers contemplated some form of constitutional amendment process 
that depended on the actions of "We the People" to ratify certain 
procedural irregularities that would otherwise render amendment 
constitutionally illegitimate. According to Ackerman, 
Rather than insulating Article V from the precedent of the Philadelphia 
Convention, sensitive readers of the text must alert themselves to the possibility 
that future generations of Americans might, like the Federalists themselves, be 
called upon to elaborate the higher law of We the People of the United States 
through legally anomalous lawmaking forms.261 
However, Ackerman's contention that ratification of the Constitution was 
"illegal" because the procedures followed in ratification did not precisely 
track those laid out in Article XIII--the requirement of a unanimous 
vote of the state legislatures for amendment-4s wrong. There are at 
least two arguments supporting the legality of ratification of the 
Constitution under the Articles. 
257. See id. at 1051-52. 
258. Id. at 1058 ("[I)n their decision to appeal to nine state 'Conventions' for 
ratification, the Founders were designing a higher lawmaking procedure that was plainly 
illegal under the Articles of Confederation"). See also id. at IO 17 (concluding that there 
cannot "be any doubt that [the Framers] were acting beyond their legal authori-
ty-especially in claiming the right to ignore both the Articles of Confederation and the 
state legislatures, by having their posturings on behalf of 'the People' ratified by similar 
'conventions' posturing in some, but not all, of the States"). For a comparison of the 
textual provisions governing ratification and amendment in the Constitution and in the 
Articles, see supra notes 157•67 and accompanying text. 
259. See Ackerman & Katya!, supra note 23, at 479-81 ("In the teeth of the 
Articles' express command, the proposed Constitution cut state legislatures out of the 
ratifying process, replacing them with special conventions in each state."). 
260. See id. at 484-87. "[!]he Federalists' initiative amounted to a vast revision of 
each state's constitution, and yet they proceeded in a manner utterly indifferent to the 
fonnal mechanisms for amendment already stipulated by state constitutional law." Id. 
at 484. 
261. Ackerman, supra note 253, at 1062. 
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One argument that James Madison made concerning the legality of 
ratification of the Constitution in the wake of the Articles' requirement 
of unanimity was that the Articles represented a treaty that had been 
breached. Under recognized principles of international law, according 
to Madison, the treaty was therefore no longer binding on any of the 
parties. Madison recognized the nature of the Articles as a compact 
among "independent sovereigns" in The Federalist No. 43 and stated: 
A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of 
legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty 
between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that 
all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one 
article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach conunitted by either 
of the parties absolves the others; and authorises them, if they please, to 
pronounce the treaty violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to 
appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent 
of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining 
parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT 
infractions with which they may be confronted?262 
Therefore, · any deviation from the Articles of Confederation after the 
multiple breaches of that agreement would not be "illegal" under 
recognized legal principles. 
However, there is a second, more powerful, argument justifying the 
procedures followed in ratifying the Constitution. The Framers could 
always appeal to :first principles of republican government in ratifying 
the Constitution. As previously noted,263 the Articles represented a 
compact among the states, establishing a society of political societies. 
As a result, despite the provisions of the Articles, the consent of a 
majority of the states should have been sufficient to amend the 
Articles.264 Furthermore, a majority of both the states and the people 
would be sufficient for ratification of the Constitution. Therefore, the 
ratification procedures found in the Constitution, which approximated a 
262. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 302 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1916). See also I RECORDS OF nm FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 122-23, 
314-17, 485; 2 id. at 93. 
263. See supra notes 210-19 and accompanying text 
264. Akhil Amar makes a similar argument Professor Amar argues: 
[f]he Articles of Confederation were a mere treaty among thirteen otherwise 
free and independent nations. That treaty had been notoriously, repeatedly, 
and flagrantly violated on every side by 1787. Under standard principles of 
international law, these material breaches of a treaty freed each party-4bat is, 
each of the thirteen states-to disregard the pact, if it so chose. Thus, if in 
1787 nine (or more) states wanted, in effect, to secede from the Articles of 
Confederation and form a new system, that was their legal right, Article XIII 
notwithstanding. 
Amar, supra note 24, at I 048 (footnotes omitted). However, Amar draws different 
conclusions from this observation. See infra notes 266-78 8Ild accompanying text. 
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requirement for consent by a majority of the states as well as the people, 
comply with the first principles of republican government that were 
thought to govern the interpretation of documents such as the Articles 
and the Constitution. Even though the Articles prescribed unanimity of 
the state legislatures for amendment, this prescription could be averted 
by ratification by a majority of the states and the people-a number that 
was approximated by approval of the majority of the people in nine state 
conventions. As a result, the Articles of Confederation did not pose a 
barrier to "legal" ratification of the Constitution. Similarly, provisions 
in the constitutions of the states prescribing procedures for amendment 
did not provide barriers to the "legality'' of ratification.265 Since such 
purported illegalities are the focus of Professor Amar's work, it is to his 
theory that we now tum. 
2. Professor Amar~ Theory: Popular Sovereignty 
Professor Amar's theory of amendment of the Constitution outside 
Article V differs somewhat from that of Professor Ackerman. According 
to Professor Amar, ''the first, most undeniable, inalienable and important, 
if unenumerated, right of the People is the right of a majority of voters 
to amend the Constitution--even in ways not expressly provided for by 
Article V."266 However, Amar argnes that ratification of the Constitu-
tion was not illegal. According to Amar, Ackerman's mistake is that he 
"fails to fully appreciate the legal character of ratification."267 Amar 
notes the apparent inconsistency of the ratification procedures with 
Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation, but adopts the Madisonian 
argnment that the Articles represented a treaty that had been breached 
and therefore was invalid.268 However, Amar also raises the possibility 
that ratification of the Constitution violated the various state constitutions 
that prescribed procedures for amendment, which were ignored.269 
This is a legitimate point. Some state constitutions did place limitations 
on the ability of the people to make amendments, such as minimum 
intervals between amendments, and Antifederalists raised concerns that 
265. See infra notes 269-78 and accompanying texl 
266. Amar, supra note 24, at 1044. 
267. Id. at 1092. 
268. See id. at 1047-48. 
269. See id. at 1049. 
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ratification of the Constitution might violate such provisions.270 Amar 
concludes, however, that the Framers obviated these objections by 
resorting to "first principles"--the people were sovereign and could 
therefore override these objections by ratifying the new Constitution 
themselves in constitutional conventions.271 As a result, Amar con-
270. See Ackerman & Katya!, supra note 23, at 484-87 (noting that the New 
Hampshire and Pennsylvania constitutions prescribed seven year intervals between 
amendment and that the Massachusetts constitution prescribed a fifteen year interval and 
authorized a convention only if two-thirds of the voters in the state agreed to one and 
that the Massachusetts and New Hampshire constitutions subordinated themselves to the 
Articles of Confederation); Amar,supra note 24, at 1049-50 (discussing the constitutions 
of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Maryland which had provisions that appeared to 
provide the exclusive means for amendment). The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 
provided as follows: 
The people of this commonwealth have the sole and exclusive right of 
governing themselves, as a ftee, sovereign, and independent state; and do, and 
forever hereafter shall, exercise and enjoy every power, jurisdiction, and right, 
which is not, or may not hereafter be, by them expressly delegated to the 
United States of America in Congress assembled. 
See MASS. CONST. OF 1780, ch. VI, art. X, reprinted in 3 THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTIIER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORJES, AND CoLONIES 1911 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909) !hereinafter THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS]. See also PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 47, reprinted 
in 5 id. at 3091; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt I, art. VII, reprinted in 4 id. at 2454. John 
Quincy Adams analyzed the legality of ratification of the new Constitution as follows: 
[T]o crown the whole the 7th: article, is an open and bare-faced violation of 
the most sacred engagements which can be formed by human beings. It 
violates the Confederation, the 13th: article of which I wish you would tum 
to, for a complete demonstration of what I affinn; and it violates the 
Constitution of this State, which was the only crime of our Berkshire & 
Hampshire insurgents (in Shays's Rebellion). 
Letter from John Quincy Adams to William Cranch (Oct 14, 1787), in 14 DOCUMENTA· 
RY HISTORY: CoMMENTARJES, supra note 236, at 223-24. Cf I RECORDS OF nm 
FEDERAL CoNVENTION, supra note 9, at 250 (remarks of Paterson) ("He reads the 5th. 
art of Confederation giving each State a vote-& the 13th. declaring that no alteration 
shall be made without unanimous consent This is the nature of all treaties. What is 
unanimously done, must be unanimously undone."). 
271. Amar, supra note 24, at 1050-54. 
[T]he rhetoric of the People's right to alter or abolish their government, 
rhetoric that appeared in virtually every state constitution and other legal texts, 
was given concrete legal meaning by the Founding Generation, and furnished 
legal support for popular ratification in Massachusetts by a mode not explicitly 
specified in that state's own constitution. 
Id. at 1053-54. Amar quotes the following passage from James Madison as support for 
bis theory: 
The difficulty in Maryland was no greater than in other States, where no 
mode of change was pointed out by the Constitution, and all officers were 
under oath to support it The people were in fact, the fountain of all power, 
and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter 
constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bill of rights, that first 
principles might be resorted to. 
Id. at 1050 (quoting 2 RECORDS OF nm FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 9, at 476). 
Madison is correct that the power of the people could override the provisions found in 
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tends that the Framers contemplated amendment of the federal Constitu-
tion outside Article V through a mere majority vote of the populace at 
large at a constitutional convention.272 According to Amar, "[t]he 
principles of popular sovereignty underlying our Constitution require that 
a deliberate majority of the People must be able to amend the Constitu-
tion if they so desire. "273 
Amar is correct in asserting that the source of ultimate political 
authority, or sovereignty, was thought by the Framers to reside in the 
people.274 Consistent with republican principles, the ultimate source 
of political authority for both the state governments275 and the general 
the state constitutions. In fact, the people can by themselves amend the federal 
Constitution utilizing the procedures found in Article V. However, at the state level all 
that is need is a majority of the people within the state under republican principles of 
government At the federal level, a majority of both the states and the people is needed, 
as Madison recognized elsewhere. Article V tracks these principles in its three-fourths 
requirement. See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text 
272. See Amar, supra note 24, at 1055 ("[A]lthough Article Vis best read as the 
exclusive mode of governmental amendment absent participation by the People, it 
should not be understood as binding the People themselves, who are the masters, not the 
servantT-who are> indeed,, the source-of Article V and the rest of the Constitution."). 
273. Id. at 1060. See also id. at 1044 ("[O]ur choice need not be limited to the 
Article V amending process versus freewheeling judicial review, as the standard question 
suggests, for there is a third, usually ignored, possibility: constitutional amendment by 
direct appeal to, and ratification by, We the People of the United States."). 
274. See Amar, supra note 2, at 1437 (noting the distinction between sovereignty 
and power made by the Federalists). 
275. See, e.g., VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art III, reprinted in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 3 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) 
("[W]henever any Government shall be found inadequate or contrary to these purposes, 
a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to 
reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most condusive to the 
publick weal."); N.C. CONST. OF 1776, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STA1E CONSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 270, at 2787 ("[A]ll political power is vested in and derived from the people 
only."); MASS, CONST. OF I 780, in 3 id. at I 890 ("All power residing originally in the 
people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government, 
vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their . .. agents, and 
are at all times accountable to them."); MD. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
art II, in id. at 1686; PA. CONST. OF 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art N, in 5 THE 
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra, at 6 (''That all power being originally inherent in, and 
consequently derived from the people; therefore all officers of government ... are their 
trustees and servants, and at all times accountable to them."); id. art V ("[T]he 
community hath an indubitable, unalienable and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or 
abolish government in such manner as shall be by that community judged most 
conducive to the public weal."). See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 
2 (U.S. 1776) ("[W]henever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, 
it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new Government, 
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government276 was to be found in the people who delegated some 
measure of power to these respective governments. In simple republics, 
such as those represented by the several states, a majority of the 
populace would be both necessary and sufficient to ratify constitutional 
lawmaking. Accordingly, even if a state constitution specified a 
different requirement for ratifying amendments to the constitution, this 
requirement could be trumped by appealing to first principles: In a 
simple republic a majority of the populace could ratify any change in the 
constitutional structure and thereby evade such heightened requirements 
found in the state constitutions. 
However, Professor Amar's error is that he applies this same analysis 
of a simple republic to the compound republic of the United States. 
While the states were simple republics, the United States as a whole was 
not, and the Federalists repeatedly emphasized this point.271 The 
United States was a compound republic---only a partial consolidation, 
and not a complete consolidation of the states was achieved under the 
Constitution. There were two channels through which the sovereignty 
of the people was expressed-a direct channel and an indirect chan-
nel. 278 Thus, when one appeals to ''first principles," one finds that, as 
Madison noted, a majority of both the people and the states would be 
necessary to ratify constitutional lawmaking in such a compound 
laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such fonn, as to 
them shall seem must likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."). 
276. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. In Chisholm v. Georgia, Justice Wilson recognized this 
vital principle of republican government in the United States. 
To the Constitution of the United States, the term SOVEREIGN, is totally 
unknown. There is but one place where it could have been used with 
propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, have comported with 
the delicacy of those, who ordained and established that Constitution. They 
might have announced themselves "SOVEREIGN" people of the United States. 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,454 (1793) (Wilson, J.). 
277. See supra notes 200-09 aod accompanying text. 
278. As James Madison noted in The Federalist No. 51, "In the compound republic 
of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct 
governments, and then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and 
separate departments." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 339 (James Madison) (Edward Mead 
Earle ed., 1976). Thus, Madison analogized the division of power between the states 
and the federal government to the division among the departments of the federal 
government. A result of these divisions, according to Madison, is that "a double security 
arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other, at 
the same time that each will be controlled by itself." Id. See also 2 DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 444 (remarks of James Wilson at the 
Pennsylvania ratifying convention) ("When the principle is once settled that the people 
are the source of authority, the consequence is, that they ... can distribute one portion 
of power to the more contracted circle, called state governments; they can furnish 
another portion of power to the government of the United States."). 
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republic. A mere majority of the people alone would not be sufficient 
to ratify constitutional lawmaking. The rules laid out in Article V for 
amendment of the Constitution closely track this model. 
B. The Constitutionality of Secession 
Although the issue of the constitutionality of secession is no longer of 
particularly urgent practical concern, it is interesting to explore the 
ramifications of the foregoing analysis for this seemingly academic 
question. It would appear that Lincoln was correct that secession was 
indeed unconstitutional.279 It was so in a way that is analogous to the 
question of the constitutionality of amendment of the Constitution 
outside Article V. States' rights advocates such as John Calhoun were 
correct in characterizing the United States as "a union of States as 
communities," but they were wrong in stating that it was "not a union 
of individuals."280 The states, by ratifying the Constitution, entered 
into a compact that was not only a compact among states, but also a 
compact among the people of the nation. The states maintained some 
measure of sovereignty-that which was not delegated to the general 
government nor reserved to the people. However, they were no longer 
"separately and individually independent'' sovereigns281--they were 
279. Lincoln described the "sophism" of secession as follows: 
The sophism itself is, that any state of the Union may, consistently with the 
national Constitution, ... withdraw from the Union, without the consent of the 
Union, or ofany other state. The little disguise that the supposed right is to 
be exercised only for just cause, themselves to be sole jlidge of its justice, is 
too thin to merit any notice. 
This sophism derives much-perhaps the whole-of its currency, from the 
assumption, that there is some omnipotent, and sacred supremacy, pertaining 
to ..• each State of our Federal Union. 
Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE 
CoLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 433 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) 
(footnotes omitted). As Lincoln noted, the consent of the people as well as the other 
states was necessary for secession. 
280. DAVID F. HOUSTON, A CRITICAL STIJDY OF NULLIFICATION IN SOUTH 
CAROLINA 82 (1896). See also JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUJSmON ON GoVERNMENT 
(1851); John Calhoun, Address on the Relation Which the States and General 
Government Bear to Each Other, in 6 WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 59 (1855); 
JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF TIIE CONFEDERATE GoVERNMENT (1958). 
281. There was some debate concerning whether the states were independent 
sovereigns upon emancipation from Great Britain. The Declaration of Independence 
proclaimed that the states were "free and independent" THE DECLARATION OF 
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essential constituents of a federal system. The consent of a majority of 
the people as well as the states was necessary to change this compact. 
Therefore, unless a majority of states approved of secession, as well as 
a majority of the populace, it would seem that secession would violate 
the Constitution. 
C. Interpretation of the Enumerated Powers of the 
General Government 
Many of the most heatedly contested issues facing modem courts that 
have been said to implicate concerns of federalism have to do with 
interpretation of the enumerated powers of the general govemment.282 
Such questions have been said to invoke the central principles of 
federalism.283 However, in reality, such questions, although clearly 
important and of immediate concern, do not invoke the core principles 
of federal structure. The method whereby a division of powers between 
the general government and the state governments is accomplished in a 
INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). However, it seems that most understood the states 
as not being completely and separately independent sovereigns, but rather joined in an 
indissoluble union. For example, Charles Cotesworth Pinclmey stated: 
The separate independence and individual sovereignty of the several states 
were never thought of by the enlightened band of patriots who framed this 
Declaration [oflndependence]; the several states are not even mentioned by 
name in any part of it,--as if it was intended to impress this maxim on 
America, that our freedom and independence arose from our union, and that 
without it we could neither be free nor independent Let us, then, consider all 
attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and 
individually independent, as a species of political heresy. 
Charles Pinclmey, Speech in the South Carolina House of Representatives (Jan. 18, 
1788), in 4 DEBATES IN TIIE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, supra note 47, at 301. See 
also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) I, 187 (Marshall, C.J.). Chief Justice 
Marshall described the relation among the states prior to ratification of the Constitution 
as follows: 
Id. 
[R]eference has been made to the political situation of [the] States, anterior to 
[the Constitution's] formation. It bas been said, that they were sovereign, were 
completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. 
This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a 
government, when they converted their Congress of Ambassadors, deputed to 
deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general 
utility, into a Legislature, empowered to enact Jaws on the most interesting 
subjects. the whole character in which the States appear, underwent a change 
282. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
283. See Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative 
Supremacy, and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United 
States, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1230 ("Every federal system of government must grapple 
with the defining element of federalism-the apportionment of authority between the 
central government and the constituent elements that make up the federal arrangement."), 
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federal system is only one minor aspect of federal structure. These 
debates really have little to do with structural provisions establishing the 
federal system under the Constitution. Instead, under the federal system 
established in the United States, the issue is merely one of interpretation 
of the enumerated powers listed in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion. 
As previously noted,284 an enumerated powers structure was not 
viewed by the Founding Generation as being essential to a federal 
system. Instead, it was one mechanism for ensuring that power would 
be distributed in a way such that liberty was protected. For example, 
Alexander Hamilton believed that setting the boundary between the 
powers of the central government and those of the states was based on 
a naked policy determination. "The extent, modifications and objects of 
the Federal authority are mere matters of discretion."285 Thus, one 
might conclude that the particular enumerated powers delegated to the 
general government and their scope might vary as they did between the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution without major changes in 
the underlying structure of the government. 
Questions concerning the proper scope of the enumerated powers of 
the general government would have arisen under the Articles of 
Confederation as well. The mechanism for dividing power between the 
general government and the state governments employed in the Articles 
was the same as that employed by the Constitution-a system of 
enumerated powers delegated to the general government, with all 
residual powers left to the states.286 First, both documents limited the 
power of the general government. The general government was not 
delegated a general legislative power, and residual powers were reserved 
to the states. Second, both documents listed those powers that were to 
be exercised by the general government, and both documents rejected a 
functionalist approach to defining the powers-one based on determina-
tions of the "competency'' of the state governments. The distribution of 
powers was fixed in the constitutional text under both documents and 
was rigidly defined. Consistent with the status of the states as constitu-
tionally-essential constituent entities of the federal structure, a sphere of 
284. See supra note 102 and accompanying text 
285. THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 52 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 
1976). 
286. See supra notes 89-102 and accompanying text. 
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authority in which they could exclusively act was preserved in the 
national Constitution. However, the particular distribution, whether 
under the Articles or under the Constitution, was merely a matter of 
policy--what distribution of powers between national and state 
authorities would prove most efficient and liberty-enhancing. Thus, 
today it seems that debates concerning "federalism" have focused on 
perhaps the least important and least interesting aspect of our constitu-
tional structure-a feature that is not essential to systems that might be 
deemed "federal." 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing analysis of the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution has demonstrated the great similarity in the federal systems 
established under these two documents and the fundamental difference 
between the two-----that the Constitution represents a partial consolidation 
of the states, a compact to which both the people and the states are 
parties. The preceding analysis has been primarily descriptive. An 
attempt has been made to gain insight into the original understanding of 
the federal structure established under the Constitution and the political 
theory informing that structure. The analysis may give guidance in the 
proper interpretation of the many provisions relating to the federal 
structure found in the Constitution. 
However, a final brief word is in order concerning the desirability of 
the federal structure established by the Framers under the Constitution. 
Under the social compact analysis presented above, the states as well as 
the people are viewed as the sources of political authority for the general 
government. The nature of a compound republic is that both the states 
and the people are represented in the general government. The result of 
such a structure is that the interests of the states as entities-the interests 
of the peoples of the several state-e represented at the level of the 
general government. Thus, such a structure ensures that the benefits of 
having a federal system with distinct states carrying on governmental 
functions that are more efficiently conducted at a more decentralized 
level are preserved and that the general government does not exercise its 
power to erode this structure. A structural safeguard exists that may 
serve to prevent the tyranny of the majority over minorities-particularly 
geographically localized minorities. Furthermore, the equal representa-
tion of the states in the Senate arguably slows the rapidity with which 
federal action may be taken, thereby encouraging deliberation. Thus, 
despite ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment, which fundamentally 
altered this structure by providing for direct election of Senators, the 
superstructure established under the Constitution remains a vital and 
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valuable mechanism for ensuring that the liberties of the people 
themselves will not be eroded. 
Under the superstructure established by the Constitution the interests 
of the states are not represented to the exclusion of national interests. 
The gove=ent established under the Constitution does represent a 
partial consolidation of the states. Thus, the interests of the majority of 
the people are also represented at the level of the general gove=ent. 
The Constitution establishes a balance between these sometimes 
competing interests. As Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federalist No. 
28, in such a system, "[p ]ower [is] ... the rival of power,"287 leading 
287. THE FEDERALIST No. 28, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward Mead Earle 
ed., 1976). Hamilton's remarks deserve further quotation: 
[l]n a confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be entirely 
the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always the rival of power; 
the General Government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations 
of the state governments; and these will have the same disposition towards the 
General GovernmenL The people, by throwing themselves into either scale, 
will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they 
can make use of the other, as the instrument of redress. 
Id. Similar remarks were made in justification of the system of separation of powers 
established under the Constitution in The Federalist No. 51. Id. No. 51, at 337 
(Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (stating that "[a]mbition must be made to 
counteract ambition"); id. at 339 (noting that "[i]n the compound republic of America 
... a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will 
controul each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself."). James 
Madison discussed at length the virtues of dividing power among a variety of 
governmental entities: 
[P]ower is of an encroaching nature, and ... ought to be effectually restrained 
from passing the limits assigned to it After discriminating therefore, in 
theory, the several classes of power, ... the next and most difficult task, is to 
provide some practical security for each against the invasion of the others. 
[T]he powers of government should be so divided and balanced among 
several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, 
without being effectually checked and restrained by the others. 
Id. No. 48, at 327, 330 (James Madison). See also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 
719, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties 
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power."); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 
458 (1991) ("Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the 
Federal Government serve to prevent the accwnulation of excessive power in any one 
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will 
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front"); Atascadero State Hosp. v. 
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 
469 U.S. 528, 572 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting)) ("The 'constitutionally mandated 
balance of power' between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the 
Framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental libertie~."'); Amar, supra note 2, 
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to better protection of individual liberty. In such a system, the people 
may cast the deciding vote and utilize whichever entity they choose-be 
it the federal or state government--to protect their interests. Thus, a 
compound republic wherein the states remain constitutionally-essential 
constituent entities is a political structure that may serve to enhance the 
liberty of the citizenry. 
at 1427 ("Guided by emerging principles of agency Jaw and organi2ation theory, the 
Federalists consciously designed a dual.agency governance structure in which each set 
of government agents would have incentives to monitor and enforce the other's 
compliance with the corporate charter established by the People of America."). 
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